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Dictation and Delegation in Securities Regulation
USHA R. RODRIGUES*
When Congress undertakes major financial reform, either it dictates the precise contours of the law itself or it delegates the bulk of the rule making to an administrative
agency. This choice has critical consequences. Making the law self-executing in federal legislation is swift, not subject to administrative tinkering, and less vulnerable
than rule making to judicial second-guessing. Agency action is, in contrast, deliberate, subject to ongoing bureaucratic fiddling, and more vulnerable than statutes to
judicial challenge.
This Article offers the first empirical analysis of the extent of congressional
delegation in securities law from 1970 to the present day, examining nine pieces of
congressional legislation. The data support what I call the dictation/delegation thesis. According to this thesis, even controlling for shifts in political-party dominance,
Congress is more likely to delegate to an agency in the wake of a salient securities
crisis than in a period of economic calm. In times of prosperity, when cohesive interest groups with unitary preferences can summon enough political will to pass
deregulatory legislation on their behalf, the result will be laws that cabin agency
discretion. In other words, when industry can play offense, Congress itself engages
in the making of governing rules and does not punt to an agency—even on issues that
would seem the logical province of administrative technocrats. In contrast, following
a crisis, industry is forced to play defense rather than offense. Its goal is to minimize
the deleterious impact of inevitable legislation by shifting regulation as much as
possible to the agency level, where it has time to regroup and often delay regulation
until the political pressure for reform abates.
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INTRODUCTION
Why does Congress sometimes dictate the contours of securities legislation itself
and other times delegate rule making to administrative agencies? Answering this
question begins with recognizing the importance of the modern administrative state
in separation-of-powers doctrine and sheds light on special-interest influence on lawmaking. Though Congress is tasked with making law, the executive branch’s
administrative agencies implement and administer a sizable portion of Congress’
enactments, determining by rule making what the law actually requires and how it
will operate in practical terms.1 Whenever Congress legislates, it has the option of
writing detailed laws—what I call dictating—in which case the executive branch will
have little or no substantive input into policy. Alternatively, Congress can hand off

1. See Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (“The power
of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created . . . program necessarily
requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or
explicitly, by Congress.” (omission in original) (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231
(1974)). Compare MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43056, COUNTING
REGULATIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING, TYPES OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, AND PAGES
IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER 6 tbl.1 (2015), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43056.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PG5L-42L6] (noting that federal agencies promulgated 3659 final rules in
2013), with Drew DeSilver, Congress Ends Least-Productive Year in Recent History,
PEW RES. CTR: FACT TANK (Dec. 23, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013
/12/23/congress-ends-least-productive-year-in-recent-history/ [https://perma.cc/EA4S-XLEG]
(noting that Congress enacted only 65 laws in 2013).
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broad rule-making authority to agencies—what I (like others) call delegating, thus
giving the executive a substantial role in the policy-making process.2
Legal scholars and political scientists have puzzled over why lawmakers would
ever voluntarily cede their power to another branch. 3 A benign explanation is that
legislators delegate when they are too busy to master the intricacies of a complicated
subject matter and instead choose to defer to the expertise of the administrative
agency with deeper knowledge of the regulated industry. More sinister stories depict
Congress as insulating itself from blame or avoiding hard choices by submitting
targets of control to a “regulatory lottery.”4 This Article examines the
dictation/delegation choice in the context of securities law.
To make the stakes concrete, compare the divergent paths of two different
securities law provisions. Title I of the JOBS Act created a new category of firm, the
emerging growth company (EGC), with reduced disclosure obligations and other advantages for firms undertaking an initial public offering (IPO). 5 For this provision,
Congress dictated the precise contours of EGC status and rights—including on issues
as to which one might expect deference to specialists. For example, Congress itself
dictated the revenue ceiling a firm could not exceed in order to qualify as an EGC. 6
And the first EGC IPO took place only three weeks after enactment. 7
Contrast with the EGCs the fate of the Volcker Rule. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act” or “Dodd-Frank”) was
signed on July 21, 2010, and required various agencies to collaborate on a rule to
prohibit banks from engaging in proprietary trading. 8 Regulators presented a

2. DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION
COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 52–85 (1999).
3. See generally Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, A Theory of
Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1982); EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 2
(analyzing Congress’s decision to delegate policy decisions to administrative agencies).
4. EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 2, at 31.
5. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 101–08, 126
Stat. 306, 307–13 (2012); see also Chris Brummer & Daniel Gorfine, The JOBS Act Isn’t All
‘Crowdfunding,’ FORBES (Oct. 8, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013
/10/08/the-jobs-act-isnt-all-crowdfunding [https://web.archive.org/web/20160324055714/http://
www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/10/08/the-jobs-act-isnt-all-crowdfunding/#611a5ab67dc6]
(summarizing Title I of the JOBS Act).
6. Brummer & Gorfine, supra note 5 (noting that Congress defined an EGC as a company with less than $1 billion in annual revenue).
7. The first EGC IPO was initiated on April 25, 2012, David Westenberg, Natural
Grocers Becomes First EGC To Traverse the IPO On-Ramp to Closing, WILMERHALE (July
30, 2012), https://www.wilmerhale.com/blog/ipo/post/?id=17179872626 [https://perma.cc/
ZF52-VWGN], twenty days after the JOBS Act was enacted on April 5, 2012. Steve
VanRoekel, The JOBS Act: Encouraging Startups, Supporting Small Businesses,
WHITE HOUSE: BLOG (Apr. 5, 2012, 4:12 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/04
/05/jobs-act-encouraging-startups-supporting-small-businesses [https://perma.cc/U8Z7-6RGU].
8. See Jennifer Wu, Comment, Morrison v. Dodd-Frank: Deciphering the Congressional Rebuttal to the Supreme Court's Ruling, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 317, 335 (2011) (noting
that Congress passed “the Dodd-Frank Act on July 10, 2010”); Press Release, Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Agencies Issue Final Rules Implementing the Volcker
Rule (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20131210a.htm
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proposed form of the Volcker Rule on November 7, 2011.9 They gave the public until
February 13, 2012, to comment on the proposed regulations and ultimately received
over 17,000 comments.10 The final rule was not released until December 10, 2013,11
and it was then revised one more time, with the final regulation being approved over
three and a half years after the legislation was initially signed.12 Moreover, much of
this rule is still not in effect yet. On December 18, 2014, “the Federal Reserve
extended the Volcker Rule’s conformance period for ‘legacy covered funds’ [a
defined term] until July 21, 2016 and indicated it would likely extend the period
further to July 21, 2017.”13
The dominant narrative of securities regulation describes a pattern of financial
boom and bust, followed by “bubble law,” “quack” regulation that is a misguided
populist reaction with little empirical support.14 In other words, a crisis leads to
reactionary legislation. This description may be accurate, but it is incomplete, because Congress sometimes legislates in the securities field in the absence of a
precipitating crisis. Building on this reality, this Article puts forward a nuanced theory of congressional action in the securities field. The dictation/delegation thesis explains why and when Congress chooses to retain control over policy and why and
when it chooses to punt to an agency in the realm of securities regulation.
Most members of Congress work for reelection, and reelection requires the
financial support of constituents—particularly constituents that contribute regularly
and generously to campaigns. These groups logically favor writing their preferences
directly into the law—that is, dictation—over delegation because legislation can be
largely self-executing and thus not subject to potentially unwanted administrative
build-outs. Put simply, in times when the political climate allows for successful
industry-sponsored legislation, Congress will tend to enact laws directly through
dictation.
However, when a securities-related crisis arises, political pressure sometimes
necessitates congressional intervention. In these cases, industry must play defense,
and its best strategy for doing so is to channel key decision making to the agency

[https://perma.cc/XK3F-QCTR].
9. Jeffrey L. Hare & Christopher N. Steelman, Federal Regulators Release Volcker Rule
Final Regulations, DLA PIPER (Dec. 11, 2013), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights
/publications/2013/12/federal-regulators-release-volcker-rule-final-re__ [https://perma.cc/C57Y
-SS3E].
10. Craig Torres & Cheyenne Hopkins, Bernanke Says U.S. Volcker Rule Won’t Be Ready
by July Deadline, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 29, 2012, 1:03 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news
/articles/2012-02-29/bernanke-says-dodd-frank-s-volcker-rule-won-t-be-ready-by-july-21-deadline
[https://web.archive.org/web/20151020172045/http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-02
-29/bernanke-says-dodd-frank-s-volcker-rule-won-t-be-ready-by-july-21-deadline].
11. Hare & Steelman, supra note 9.
12. See Torres & Hopkins, supra note 10.
13. DAVID HARPEST & JOSHUA HOROWITZ, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, FIRST TAKE: TEN
KEY POINTS FROM THE FED’S VOLCKER RULE COVERED FUNDS EXTENSION (2014), http://
www.pwc.com/en_US/us/financial-services/regulatory-services/publications/assets/2014-volcker
-rule-ccovered-funds.pdf [https://perma.cc/PM8M-AYZW].
14. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate
Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1784 (2011); Roberta Romano, The SarbanesOxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005).
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level. There, regulation can be delayed, diluted, and, if all else fails, disputed in court.
Agency action is subject to inevitable delay because of the lengthy notice-andcomment rule-making process agencies must follow. What’s more, industry groups
have the time and money to lobby regulators during the rule-making process to shape
agency choices in ways favorable to their own interests. Finally, the validity of any
agency rule making can ultimately be challenged in court, whereas direct congressional action is relatively immune from judicial second-guessing.
Thus, the dictation/delegation thesis proposes that in noncrisis conditions when
an industry has unitary preferences, it will favor dictation. Moreover, it hypothesizes
that industry interest groups with a substantial history of campaign contributions and
lobbying efforts will in noncrisis times succeed in persuading Congress to enact their
preference for legislation that dictates the details of law—that is, articulates the precise contours of regulation. I do not mean to suggest a simple and inevitable binary
world, where delegation necessarily follows crisis and dictation occurs only in
noncrisis periods. Instead, I suggest that statutes exist along a continuum of dictation
and delegation and that salient crises play a significant role in determining where
along that continuum individual enactments fall. For the sake of clarity, I will
emphasize that by dictation I do not mean dictatorial. Dictation refers to whether
Congress chooses to make the law self-executing, leaving the agency with virtually
nothing to do. Delegation is where Congress delegates the question to agency rule
making—even if it hems in the rule makers with myriad dictatorial suggestions, the
final contours of the rule are left to the agency’s discretion.
This Article develops these ideas in six parts. Part I surveys the literature,
describing how the scholarship on the political economy of securities regulation has
narrowly focused on postcrisis legislation, at the expense of understanding the larger
landscape of securities law. The political science and administrative law literatures,
in contrast, do not consider how salient crises affect Congress’s decision to dictate
or delegate, nor how Congress’s delegation patterns may wax and wane over time.
Thus an unanswered question remains at the intersection of these fields: does
Congress delegate differently in securities law in the wake of crisis? Part II articulates
the dictation/delegation thesis. Part III offers brief histories of the relevant securities
laws, including both postcrisis and noncrisis enactments. A word of explanation is
appropriate here as to my definition of crisis. For the purposes of this study, economic malaise is not enough. Crisis legislation is legislation spurred either by a salient securities or market shock that provides a specific reason for legislators to look
to securities regulation—as opposed to more general financial stimulus or tax
policy—as the appropriate response. The Paperwork Crisis of 1967–70, which at its
height caused Wall Street to suspend trading altogether on Wednesdays, spawned the
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (SIPA) and the Securities Amendments of
1975.15 The financial fraud uncovered in the wake of the dot-com crash of 2000
prompted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX),16 and the financial crisis of 2008
produced the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.17 The noncrisis securities legislation includes
the Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980 (SBIIA), National Securities

15. See infra Part III.A.1.
16. See infra Part III.A.2.
17. See infra Part III.A.3.
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Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA), Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
(SLUSA), and the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 (“JOBS Act”).18
Notably, Silicon Valley players strongly backed four of these five acts. 19
Part IV of the Article tests the dictation/delegation thesis by conducting an
original empirical study of the extent of delegation of legislation over a forty-fiveyear period, from 1970 to 2014. That time period spanned three separate financial
crises and Congress’s enactment of nine separate pieces of securities legislation. The
data support the dictation/delegation thesis: more delegation occurs postcrisis. It then
moves to anticipate two separate objections. One is that party politics offers a better
explanation for congressional delegation—but the data show that Congress delegates
more postcrisis, even controlling for divided government. A second potential critique
is that Congress delegates in times of crisis because it has much less time to educate
itself. But, with the exception of 1970’s SIPA and SOX, all of the “crisis” legislation
is more accurately characterized as “postcrisis” in nature. Each was in a state of
equilibrium, seeking to address the root problems of the precipitating crisis so that it
would not happen again.20 Thus, there was ample time for dictating specific
policies—if Congress had wished to do so.
As Part V explains, a more granular analysis of legislative acts reveals the
limitations of the thesis. Most notably, the JOBS Act contains extensive delegations,
even though it was not passed in response to a salient financial crisis. Because no
scholar has yet examined the political economy of the JOBS Act, Part V.B looks
closely at that subject, and the results are revealing. Three of the JOBS Act’s titles
were backed by Silicon Valley or by sophisticated financial institutions.21 These titles
contain minimal delegation.22 In contrast, relative political novices backed two of the
other titles of the JOBS Act, and in the last one its initial advocates signaled an assent
to delegation to the SEC—perhaps because of formidable adverse interests in the
form of state securities law administrators.23 These titles contain more substantial
delegation. Indeed, the crowdfunding title contains the second-highest number of
delegations of any title in the sample.24
I. THE EXISTING LITERATURE
There are two standard accounts of the political economy that can apply to federal
securities regulation. The first focuses on securities regulation itself, and on a particular aspect of it: it posits that Congress reacts to crisis by producing “bubble laws.”

18. See infra Part III.B.
19. SBIIA was backed by Heizer Corporation, a venture capital fund. See infra
Part III.B.1. PLSRA and SLUSA were backed by Silicon Valley actors. See infra Part III.B.2.
The JOBS Act was largely backed by Silicon Valley actors. See infra Part III.B.4.
20. See infra Part III.A (describing securities-related crises and Congress’s responses to them).
21. Silicon Valley actors backed Title I. See discussion infra Part III.B.4. SecondMarket,
a sophisticated financial institution, backed Title V. See infra Part V.B.1.b. Small banks supported the passage of Title VI. See infra Part V.B.1.c.
22. See infra Part V.B.1.
23. See infra Part V.B.2.
24. See infra Part V.B.2.b.
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As to the second, it holds that Congress will delegate more in some fields than in
others. Both of these accounts fall short in distinct ways: On one hand, securities law
scholars have not sufficiently accounted for either the larger history of securities law
or the crucial question of the degree to which a particular law delegates policymaking agency. On the other hand, the delegation literature has failed to account for
the possibility that Congress may alternate between dictation and delegation in a
given subject matter. Moreover, this literature overlooks the field of securities law
entirely. This Part will offer a brief survey of both accounts.
First, a dominant narrative in the legal academy views congressional securities
regulation as problematic “quackery,” “bubble laws” produced in times of crisis by
a foolish Congress that cares nothing for empiricism. 25 Part A will describe the arguments of these academics, most notably Roberta Romano, Stephen Bainbridge, and
Larry Ribstein. Their pointed critiques are incisive but ultimately limited because
they focus solely on postcrisis laws—most notably, Sarbanes-Oxley and DoddFrank. Panning back to examine the broader history of securities regulation reveals
that Congress does not always legislate in reaction to crisis in the securities arena.
Sometimes it intervenes in the securities realm in a noncrisis context, and when it
does, it is much more likely to spell out the details of the law, delegating relatively
little to agencies.
Part B examines the delegation literature. Both administrative law scholars and
political scientists have focused on the important question of when and why Congress
delegates to administrative agencies. Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gelhorn, and Glen O.
Robinson’s foundational article addressed when a legislature might want to delegate
to an agency—either to defer to bureaucratic expertise or to deflect politically sensitive questions to the agency level. 26 Matthew C. Stephenson used models to predict
when Congress might delegate to agency or to courts. 27
There is an underlying premise to these treatments that goes unspoken—namely,
from the constituent’s perspective, delegation is always second-best. The best-case
scenario is not to delegate at all—to have one’s preferences encoded directly into
legislation, free from the risks of delay, dilution, and disputation that Part II will
address.
Unlike the securities scholars, political scientists David Epstein and Sharyn
O'Halloran focus on the degree of delegation a statute contains. Indeed, they construct a complicated model after coding 257 statutes to measure the extent of delegation in various categories of legislation. 28 Their analysis, however, suffers from a
high degree of generality because the researchers collapse a diverse range of financial
regulation into a single overarching descriptive category, “Banking and Finance.”29
They fail to identify securities regulation as a category at all.30 More importantly,
their self-professed goal is to determine substantive areas where Congress delegates

25. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 1784; Romano, supra note 14.
26. See Aranson et al., supra note 3, at 5–7.
27. Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty,
Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1036 (2006).
28. EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 2, at 89.
29. See id. at 202.
30. Id.
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relatively more or less.31 Their account is thus categorical and static: they do not
account for the possibility that within a single area Congress might oscillate between
dictation and delegation or for why that might be.
A. Legal Literature on the Politics of Securities Regulation
The standard narrative of financial regulation describes a “centuries-old cycle” of
boom, bubble, bust, and regulatory response. 32 As a result, federal regulation inevitably expands after “significant economic turmoil.” 33 Larry Ribstein, Stuart Banner,
and others have traced this recurring pattern as far back as the South Sea Bubble of
172034 and the Future Trading Act of 1921, which followed “the most severe recession in the United States up to that time.” 35 The Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 followed the 1929 stock market crash and ensuing
Great Depression.36 SOX responded to the downturn of 2000 and the accompanying
bankruptcies of Enron and WorldCom. 37 Dodd-Frank was an attempt to address the
financial crisis of 2008.38 Indeed, this pattern of financial crisis and regulation played
out in both the United States and the United Kingdom in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.39
John C. Coates observes that this legislative cycle is natural.40 After a salient
crisis, “[e]ven if [the] legislative response[] [is] bad for the public,” politicians benefit as long as the problem is complicated and the legislation has a chance to solve the
problem.41 He observes that “[a]ction allows politicians to show they can ‘do something’ while inaction requires politicians to defend a status quo tainted in the voting
public's mind by the salient fact of market downturn or scandal.” 42
Four preeminent corporate law scholars have addressed this legislative pattern in
important articles. Three of them, Roberta Romano, Larry Ribstein, and Stephen
Bainbridge, decry financial regulation in response to crisis as “bubble law” or
“quackery.”43 The fourth, John Coffee, defends postcrisis regulation, arguing that
any excesses are ultimately leavened by agency action in a pattern he dubs the

31. See id. at 197 (describing how the chapter divides legislation into categories to determine if Congress delegates more in “policy areas shrouded in uncertainty”).
32. Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77, 77–78 (2003).
33. Romano, supra note 14, at 1591.
34. Ribstein, supra note 32, at 94–95.
35. Romano, supra note 14, at 1591; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy
of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends To Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk
Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1021 (2012).
36. See Romano, supra note 14, at 1592.
37. Coffee, supra note 35, at 1020; Romano, supra note 14, at 1523.
38. See Coffee, supra note 35, at 1020.
39. See Romano, supra note 14, at 1593 (citing Stuart Banner’s historical research).
40. See John C. Coates IV, Private vs. Political Choice of Securities Regulation: A
Political Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 531, 569 (2001) (“When crashes, scandals
and recessions occur together, as they have in the past, the pressure (or opportunity) for politicians to act is most acute.”).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See generally Bainbridge, supra note 14; Ribstein, supra note 32; Romano, supra note 14.
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“regulatory sine curve.”44 Thus, the accepted perspective is that Congress legislates
following crisis, and it does so to regulate. Coffee defends what the other three denounce, but all four agree on the underlying cycle. These four scholars do not address
how and when a deregulatory legislative agenda could ever gain purchase in
Congress—as it did, for example, in the JOBS Act.45
Professor Romano accepts the pattern as descriptively accurate—although she
laments it. She explains that “financial exigencies embolden critics of markets to
push their regulatory agenda. They are able to play on the strand of popular opinion
that is hostile to speculation and markets because the general public is more amenable
to regulation after experiencing financial losses.” 46 The unhappy result is “quack
corporate governance,” passed in crisis and unsupported by empirical evidence. 47
Because she suggests that regulation works as a one-way ratchet, her policy prescription is for mandatory sunset provisions. At least with such a legislative check, cooler
heads can prevail in due course and dial back the populist excesses of postcrisis
legislation.48
Professor Larry Ribstein termed the legislative product of this regulatory cycle
“bubble laws”:
In normal and boom times, new regulation would not help any distinct
group enough to motivate the group to push for it. . . .
Crashes destabilize this interest group equilibrium in several ways.
First, the more marginal firms, start-ups, and others that profited from
the boom and opposed regulation that might thwart it, are now financially
too weak to have much political clout. Second, pro-regulatory forces can
enlist new supporters by arguing that regulation would restore “investor
confidence”—code for more buyers and therefore higher prices. Third,
reformers can draw on populism and envy of the rich, which abates only
as long as the rich generate significant wealth for the rest of us.49
Professor Stephen M. Bainbridge performed a similar post-mortem on DoddFrank, judging it, too, to be a “bubble law.” 50
In ordinary times, Washington typically has more important issues on
its plate than corporate governance. In a bubble period, moreover, federal
regulatory action is even less likely because interest groups like
shareholders and consumers may be lulled into inaction by the seemingly
ever-rising value of their portfolios. . . . When the bubble inevitably

44. See Coffee, supra note 35, at 1029 (“This Article’s fundamental premise is that a
‘Regulatory Sine Curve’ governs the intensity of the oversight exercised by financial regulators.”).
45. To be fair, Bainbridge does in other work acknowledge deregulatory tendencies. See
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice Between
Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REV. 1589, 1603 (1999).
46. Romano, supra note 25, at 1593.
47. Id. at 1529.
48. See id. at 1593. (“A regulatory agenda, in short, does not generate popular support in
a booming market.”).
49. Ribstein, supra note 32, at 79 (footnote omitted).
50. Bainbridge, supra note 25, at 1784.
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bursts, investigators reviewing the rubble begin to turn up evidence of
speculative excess and even outright, rampant fraud. Investors burnt by
losses from the breaking of the bubble and outraged by evidence of
misconduct by corporate insiders and financial bigwigs create populist
pressure for new regulation.51
Professor John C. Coffee responded to the Romano-Ribstein-Bainbridge critique
in The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends To Be
Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated.52 Coffee’s analysis begins with an acceptance of Romano’s premise that “Congress seems to only pass securities and
financial reform legislation after a crash or similar crisis[.]” 53 For Coffee, however,
this pattern is not fraught with illegitimacy and quack legislation—rather, it is reflective of salutary republican self-government.54 He brands Romano, Ribstein, and
Bainbridge as members of a “Tea Party Caucus,” whose first tenet is “Congress
should not legislate after a market crash, because the result will be a ‘Bubble Law’
that crudely overregulates.”55
Coffee does not deny that republican self-government can produce overreaction
in congressional treatment of securities laws. But he downplays this risk by arguing
that administrative rule making can correct the excesses of postcrisis regulation.56 He
dubs this mellowing influence the “Regulatory Sine Curve.”57 One example should
suffice.58 Section 956 of Dodd-Frank required “covered financial institution[s] to
disclose . . . the structures of all incentive-based compensation” paid to officers, directors and employees that “could lead to material financial loss to the covered financial institution.”59 While the legislative language could have required specific
disclosures regarding the compensation of numerous individuals, including the very
kinds of traders whose speculation led to the downfall of Barings Bank and massive
losses at Societe Generale, the principal financial regulators jointly adopted rules that
favored generalized narrative over quantitative data and left to the individual financial institution the calculus of which of its employees could cause a material
financial loss.60
The battle lines are thus clear: Bainbridge, Romano, and Ribstein condemn
congressional intervention in business law, advocating for increased state power,
sunsets, and other measures to curb excessive regulatory legislation. Opposing them,
Coffee argues that postcrisis financial regulation is a positive feature of representative democracy and that administrative agencies can temper any particularly

51. Id. at 1785 (footnotes omitted).
52. See Coffee, supra note 35, at 1019–20.
53. Id. at 1021.
54. See id. at 1022.
55. Id. at 1024.
56. See id. at 1037.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., id. at 1065–78 (surveying the Regulatory Sine Curve as demonstrated by the
implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act).
59. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 956(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1905 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5641 (2012)).
60. Coffee, supra note 35, at 1069–70.
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egregious law. Despite their deep philosophical differences, however, all four scholars agree on the fundamental premise: at the level of federal legislation, law follows
crisis.
But that is not always true. The JOBS Act of 201261 was not enacted in response
to a crisis, and it marks a radical deregulation in securities law. Consider these
specifics:
 Title I makes it easier for “emerging growth companies”—as defined, almost
all companies—to go public.62 Once public, it grants them relief from many
normal disclosure requirements for up to five years.63
 Title II for the first time since 1933 allows private firms to solicit investors
from the general public.64
 Title III for the first time allows private firms to accept investments from
average investors.65
 Title IV raises the limit on funds that private firms can raise funds from $5
million to $50 million.66
 Title V raises the number of shareholders a firm can have while still remaining
private from 500 to 2000.67
 Title VI allows public banks to go private with as many as 1200 shareholders,
quadrupling the pre-JOBS-Act requirement of 300 shareholders.68

61. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 101, 126 Stat.
306, 307 (2012).
62. See Brummer & Gorfine, supra note 5.
63. See § 101(a), 126 Stat at 307 (granting “emerging growth company” status until the
earliest of a few dates including “the last day of the fiscal year . . . following the fifth
anniversary of the date . . . pursuant to an effective registration”).
64. See Chance Barnett, The Crowdfunder’s Guide to General Solicitation and Title II of
the JOBS Act, FORBES (Sept. 23, 2013, 10:40 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett
/2013/09/23/the-crowdfunders-guide-to-general-solicitation-title-ii-of-the-jobs-act [http://web
.archive.org/web/20161203041259/http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2013/09/23/the
-crowdfunders-guide-to-general-solicitation-title-ii-of-the-jobs-act/#1e41831a539a] (describing
Title II).
65. See Chance Barnett, JOBS Act Title III: Investment Being Democratized, Moving
Online, FORBES (Oct. 23, 2013 9:29 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett
/2013/10/23/sec-jobs-act-title-iii-investment-being-democratized-moving-online [http://web
.archive.org/web/20161203041258/http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2013/10/23/sec
-jobs-act-title-iii-investment-being-democratized-moving-online/#56627e68346e] (describing
Title III).
66. Kendall Almerico, SEC: Startups Can Now Raise $50 Million in ‘Mini IPO,’
ENTREPRENEUR (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/244278 [https://perma.cc
/4BHR-MUCW].
67. Susan Beblavi, Note, JOBS Act Title V: Raising Threshold for Registration, 90 DENV.
U. L. REV. ONLINE 63, 63 (2013).
68. § 601, 126 Stat at 326 (amending shareholder threshold for registration from 300 to
1200 for a “bank or bank holding company”).
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The JOBS Act, then, came as a fundamental deregulation of securities law. In
their “bubble law” critique, Romano, Ribstein, and Bainbridge do not discuss the
possibility of democratic forces that act to deregulate, rather than impose new regulations.69 Nevertheless, even before the JOBS Act, Congress passed such laws in 1980,
1995, 1996, and 1998.70
To be fair, Coffee is, for reasons of timing, the only one of these scholars who
even had the chance to theorize the JOBS Act. But rather than acknowledging its
importance, he swept the Act into his larger regulatory-sine-curve theory:
Above all, this episode shows again that, once a crisis passes, Congress
can easily be persuaded to repeal legislation that it passed in response to
the crisis. This proves not that the original legislation was flawed, but
more that Congress can be manipulated, has a limited attention span, and
will sometimes accept makeweight arguments, particularly in an election
year.71
Coffee’s realist treatment of the JOBS Act misses its distinctive position as a
freestanding deregulatory law. His regulatory sine curve story focused exclusively
on administrative agency-, judiciary-, and industry-based actions that loosened the
regulatory requirements.72 It was agency implementation that sheathed the sword of
Dodd-Frank section 956. With the JOBS Act Congress acted to deregulate—a
distinctive type of deregulation that the conventional securities law narrative does
not contemplate.73

69. Bainbridge’s other work paints a more nuanced picture of the political landscape and
acknowledges that Congress can also pass deregulatory reform if it is ambitious enough to
animate “Main Street.” See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance,
18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 671, 704 n.160 (1995).
70. See infra Part III.B (identifying and discussing securities legislation passed in the absence of crisis).
71. Coffee, supra note 35, at 1078.
72. See id. at 1030 (“The key implication of the Regulatory Sine Curve is not that legislation is futile, but that erosion of the statute's commands will predictably begin shortly after its
passage.”).
73. Coffee gives three instances of agency pullback from the congressional directions of
SOX. First, although in SOX section 402 Congress prohibited company loans to executives, a
group of twenty-five major law firms “released a memorandum explaining how they would
interpret [the law] and the SEC quietly acquiesced.” Id. at 1042. Coffee opined that “the bar
simply replaced the SEC as the authoritative interpreter of the statute's meaning.” Id. Second,
Coffee details how Sarbanes-Oxley’s most onerous provision, section 404(b)’s despised
internal-control-audit requirement, was actually imposed by PCAOB, not Congress at all. Id.
at 1038. Eventually the SEC and the PCAOB separately acted to mitigate the effects of section
404 on smaller companies. See id. at 1038–41. Third, while pursuant to the directives of SOX
section 307 the SEC adopted standards of conduct for attorneys appearing before it, there has
been “[t]otal silence” in SEC enforcement, “[d]espite numerous instances in which lawyers
were clearly aware of executive misconduct.” Id. at 1044.
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B. The Delegation Literature
While securities law scholars have focused on “bubble” legislation, administrative
law scholars and political scientists have focused on the more general question of
congressional delegation. Public choice theorists of administrative law have concerned themselves with when legislators might choose to delegate to the agency. 74
Aranson, Gellhorn, and Robinson describe both managerial explanations for delegation—where Congress delegates for benign reasons such as reducing workloads,
deferring to agency expertise, and assuring continuity of decision makers75—and
political explanations, most notably where delegation removes a politically sensitive
question to the less political and more “rational” agency forum.76 In the end, Aronson
et al. take a more cynical view, explaining delegation as a means for members of
Congress to deliver private benefits to their constituents. 77 Later work has attempted
to model how legislators might weigh the choice between delegating to an agency
versus delegating to the courts.78
Political scientists also have focused on why Congress often delegates in practice.
In general terms, they offer three reasons as to why Congress delegates in some areas
rather than others. First, Congress delegates to promote relationships with
constituents—to free up legislator time for service to constituents, to allow legislators
to play the role of ombudsman for the constituent subject to the vagaries of agency
bureaucracy, and maybe even to form a sort of “protection racket” where constituents
who fail to contribute to the legislator’s campaign may be threatened with unappealing regulation.79 Second, a “regulatory lottery” may exist; on this view, when
interest groups clash, they may prefer to take their chances with an agency rather
than risk a costly battle for a particular outcome in the legislature. 80 The third posits
that delegation allows for a legislative “win-win” in cases where a large group can
be appeased that the agency will act “in the public interest” and more concentrated
interest groups can lobby the agency to promulgate regulations favorable to them. 81
Epstein and O’Halloran articulate the most robust delegation theory in their book,
Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under
Separate Powers.82 They ask simply: “[W]hy does Congress delegate broad authority
to the executive in some policy areas and not in others?”83 Their answer to this

74. See Aranson et al., supra note 3, at 5.
75. Id. at 21; see also EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 2, at 29.
76. Aranson et al., supra note 3, at 25.
77. Id. at 63. Aranson, Gellhorn, and Robinson argue that such delegation is improper,
and that the nondelegation doctrine should constrain Congress more. See id. (“The delegation
of legislative authority to agencies, which facilitates the regulatory production of private benefits . . . has been a growing problem . . . . A renewed nondelegation doctrine that limits the
original legislative delegations as well as any subsequent agency assumption of legislative
power, however, should reduce the use of regulation to produce private benefits . . . .”).
78. Stephenson, supra note 27, at 1036.
79. EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 2, at 30–31.
80. Id. at 31.
81. Id. at 32.
82. Id. at xv (introducing a summary of the book’s content in the preface).
83. Id. at 7.
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question is built around a “transaction cost politics” theory.84 Analogizing to the
familiar question confronting firms as to whether to “make or buy,” Epstein and
O’Halloran argue that legislators will sometimes “make” legislation themselves
(that is, dictate exactly what the law will be) and at other times “buy” it from outside
(that is, delegate to the executive).85 Epstein and O’Halloran predict that the dictateor-delegate decision “will be made in such a way as to maximize legislators’ political
goals”—that is, reelection.86
Epstein and O’Halloran test their theory by way of a large sample of important
legislation from 1947 to 1990.87 Their model yields several more detailed predictions, which they test on their sample. 88 But they do not separate out securities laws
as a distinct category.89 And more problematically, they look at each issue area as a
whole, comparing, for example, the extent to which Congress delegates in tax law
versus environmental law.90 They do not examine variation in delegation between
statutes in the same issue area.91 Thus, they cannot account for why, in a single subject matter area, Congress might sometimes delegate and sometimes dictate.
Thus, a brief survey of the existing literature reveals the gap that this Article seeks
to fill. The theory, explicated in the next section, is that the dominant securities law
narrative tells only a third of the story. Yes, Congress acts postcrisis—but it also acts
in the absence of crisis. Moreover, the nature of its legislation—more precisely, of
its delegation—varies depending on whether a crisis precipitated it.
II. THE DICTATION VS. DELEGATION THESIS
Legislators seek to maximize their chances of reelection. 92 Reelection requires the
backing of constituents that can mobilize support at the ballot box or can contribute
the money that campaigns require. Thus, legislators care the most about constituents
most likely to help them with reelection—those that contribute to the officeholder’s
campaign and have regularly done so in the past. All things being equal, then, repeat
players fare better than single-issue constituents that seek a targeted intervention in
politics.93

84. Id. at 7–9.
85. See id. at 7 (“[W]hen deciding where policy will be made, Congress trades off the
internal policy production costs of the committee system against the external costs of delegation. Thus, Congress’s decision to delegate is similar to a firm’s make-or-buy decision . . . .”).
86. Id. at 9.
87. Id. at 87 (introducing the data set based on Mayhew’s list of important legislation).
See generally id. at 86–120.
88. See, e.g., id. at 196–231 (dividing legislation into different subject areas and discussing whether Congress delegates more in particular areas of law).
89. Id. at 199.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 47. “Since legislators’ primary goal is reelection, it follows that policy will be
made in such a way as to maximize legislators’ reelection chances; delegation will follow the
natural fault lines of legislators’ political advantage.” Id.
93. Cf. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974). Galanter first introduced the key distinction
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The dictation/delegation thesis posits that, in general, legislators will dictate and
delegate according to constituents’ preferences—particularly the preferences of
those constituents who are wealthy and politically active. In general, when industry
has unitary preferences, a history of active campaign and political action committee
contributions, and effective lobbying machinery, its preference is for legislation that
dictates the details of law—that is, that articulates the precise contours of regulation.
Thus, in times when the political climate allows for successful industry-sponsored
legislation, the first best option for Congress is dictation rather than delegation.
In contrast, following a salient crisis, industry will play defense rather than
offense. Its lobbying then focuses on minimizing the deleterious impact of inevitable
legislation by shifting regulation as much as possible to the agency level. This strategy may be characterized as delay, dilute, and dispute. Agency action is by its nature
slow, subject to lobbying, and vulnerable to challenge in the courts.
The balance of this Article will explore the manifestation of dictation and
delegation in securities law over time, but one important caveat must precede that
discussion. The securities law landscape is complicated. I do not intend to reduce it
to a simple formula, whereby crisis necessarily precipitates delegation and noncrisis
always prompts dictation. On the contrary, Part V will elaborate on statutes that do
not neatly fit the dictation/delegation pattern. It is enough to suggest that the question
of delegation is of fundamental concern in understanding the broad scope of securities regulation, and that we can discern revealing patterns in delegation over time.
A few examples from recent law show how much the delegation question matters.
First, consider the inherent delay that delegation entails. Upon delegation, the agency
must study the question and propose rules to the public. 94 Merely formulating rules
to propose takes much time. For example, Title III of the JOBS Act required the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to propose rules within 270 days after
enactment, which would have been December 31, 2012.95 Thus, the statute itself
contemplated a nine-month delay. But the real-world delay was far longer: the
agency did not even propose rules until October 2013, ten months after its
congressionally imposed deadline.96 In addition, once the agency proposes a rule, it
is subject to a notice-and-comment period, after which the agency must craft a final

between repeat players and one-shotters. Id. at 97–98. Galanter’s insight was in the litigation
realm, but his insights have traction in the political realm as well.
94. See Emily S. Bremer, A Primer on the Informal Rulemaking Process, ADMIN.
CONF. U.S.: ADMIN. FIX (May 10, 2013, 11:56 AM), https://www.acus.gov/newsroom
/administrative-fix-blog/primer-informal-rulemaking-process [https://perma.cc/QS6U-4CNV]
(explaining that informal rule making requires an agency to publish its proposed rule, give the
public an opportunity to comment, and promulgate a final rule after taking comments into
account). There are two forms of agency rule making, but informal is the dominant method
because formal requires more procedure in promulgating a rule, such that most agree it is
impracticable. Edward Rubin, It’s Time To Make the Administrative Procedure Act
Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 107 (2003).
95. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(c), 126 Stat.
306, 320 (2012).
96. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Issues Proposal on Crowdfunding (Oct.
23, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370540017677 [https://
perma.cc/3F46-HWG3].
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rule that reflects a responsiveness to the public’s input. 97 Hence, by its very nature,
reform delegated is reform delayed.
Delay is not the only distinguishing feature of agency action; dilution can and
often does occur at the agency level. While the SEC prepares its draft regulation,
industry advocates can lobby to weaken any proposed reforms.98 In the field of financial regulation, Professor Kimberly Krawiec conducted a groundbreaking study of
federal regulators with various interest groups during the preproposal period for the
Volcker Rule and found that financial institutions met with regulators 351 times,
accounting for 78% of all such meetings.99 During the same time period, public
interest, labor, research, and advocacy groups met with these same regulators a total
of only thirty-one times.100 Krawiec found that “financial institutions, financial
industry trade groups, and law firms representing such institutions and trade groups
collectively accounted for 93.1% of all federal agency Volcker Rule meetings,
whereas public interest, research, advocacy, and labor groups, and other persons and
organizations, accounted for only 6.9%.”101
While the meeting logs reveal only the incidence of the meetings, we can presume
that in the course of the 351 times where financial industry representatives met with
agency officials, they often advocated for positions favorable to their clients—
positions that likely represented a dilution of Congress’s regulatory intent in DoddFrank. The potential for such lobbying is a key feature of agency action; in contrast,
if the law is self-executing, there is no need (or opportunity) to lobby further.
Credit risk retention under Dodd-Frank provides another example of dilution. In
Dodd-Frank section 941, Congress sought to prevent banks from making subprime
loans and securitizing them to palm all of the attendant risks of default onto investors
by requiring that they retain some default risk on their balance sheets. But section
941 contained an exception for qualified residential mortgages (QRM), and Joshua
White details how the housing and mortgage industries pushed back on the definition
of QRMs, to the point that regulators reproposed the rule, which was diluted to the
point of (in the words of Barney Frank) “effectively abolishing risk retention.” 102
Even without direct, industry lobbying, the SEC itself may be sympathetic to
industry calls for deregulation or modulated regulation. Professor John Coates has
argued that in times of crisis it functions as a “political circuit breaker,” softening

97. Bremer, supra note 94.
98. See Elizabeth Shell, Which Federal Agencies Do Lobbyists Target Most?, PBS.ORG
(June 13, 2014, 3:21 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/agencies-lobbies-target/
[https://perma.cc/7UJ5-PQXK] (“Since 1998, more than $41 billion has been spent by companies, unions and other organizations to lobby federal agencies and the U.S. Congress. In 2013,
more than 9,900 lobbyists spent $3.23 billion trying to influence law writers and policy
makers.”).
99. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plummer”: The Sausage-Making of
Financial Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 79–80 (2013).
100. Id. at 80. Krawiec notes, “This is nearly the same number of times that a single financial institution—J.P. Morgan Chase—met with federal agencies on Volcker Rule interpretation and implementation.” Id.
101. Id. at 80.
102. Joshua T. White, The Evolving Role of Economic Analysis in SEC Rulemaking, 50
GA. L. REV. 293, 317–20, 323 (2015).
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external pressures to regulate.103 Professor Donald Langevoort likewise observes that
action by the SEC may offer cover to Congress in the face of scandal by providing
“illusory regulation” that leads the public to believe that more investor protection
exists than is justified in reality.104 And, in the “normal” political periods when
securities-related topics are not on the “public agenda,” the SEC will likely be more
attuned to interest groups like corporations, large investors, investment banks,
venture capital funds, and Wall Street law firms than to the general electorate.105
Finally, if the SEC engages in unwelcome rule making, industry can dispute
agency action in court. Take the case of proxy access. Reformers have long argued
that the corporate ballot gives no real choice to shareholders. 106 Elections are not
contested: while shareholders can approve or disapprove management’s nominees,
they cannot include their own. 107 Section 971 of Dodd-Frank resolved a longstanding dispute about SEC authority to regulate in the realm of proxy access by
granting the SEC the power to require public companies to include shareholder nominees in the corporate ballot.108 Proxy-access reformers in 2010 would have been justified in expecting that the resulting SEC rules would finally make proxy access a
reality.
Yet in Business Roundtable v. SEC,109 the D.C. Circuit applied rigorous costbenefit analysis to the SEC’s final rules on proxy access and rejected them as “arbitrary and capricious” under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 110 According
to the Court, the SEC “inconsistently and opportunistically framed the costs and
benefits of the rule; failed adequately to quantify the certain costs or to explain why
those costs could not be quantified; neglected to support its predictive judgments;
contradicted itself; and failed to respond to substantial problems raised by commenters.”111 Moreover, the Court came to this conclusion despite the significant amount
of cost-benefit analysis the SEC actually undertook when drafting the rule.
Thus, if delay and dilution are not enough to make agency action more palatable,
industry can dispute it in court. Even if the agency relies on empirical research in
support of its action, a court may second-guess and ultimately overturn it as arbitrary
and capricious.112 In contrast, congressional legislation is all but immune from judicial review.

103. Coates, supra note 40, at 553–57.
104. Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Lawmaker: Choices About Investor Protection
in the Face of Uncertainty, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1591, 1600 (2006).
105. Coates, supra note 40, at 561–62.
106. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118
HARV. L. REV. 833, 856 (2005) (stating that, “under current arrangements, shareholders seeking to exercise their theoretical power to replace directors face substantial impediments” and
noting that, “outside the hostile-takeover context, the incidence of electoral challenges to
directors is negligible”).
107. See id. (“Challengers do not have the access to the corporate ballot and to the corporation’s proxy machinery that incumbents enjoy.”).
108. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 971, 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010).
109. Bus. Roundtable v. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
110. Id. at 1148.
111. Id. at 1148–49.
112. The court criticized the SEC for not appropriately considering studies that showed a
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Delegation matters because any matter delegated to an administrative agency can
be delayed, diluted, and ultimately disputed; matters as to which Congress itself dictates the law cannot. The dictation/delegation thesis predicts that in noncrisis conditions, where industry has unified preferences, Congress will dictate more; whereas
in conditions where financial crisis is salient, Congress will delegate more. But caveats are in order. First, the dictation/delegation thesis speaks to general trends rather
than hard-and-fast rules. There may well be instances of delegation in a noncrisis
environment and occasions of postcrisis dictation. Moreover, there may be times
when industry does not unite around a given policy. For example, as Aranson,
Gellhorn, and Robinson argue, even in noncrisis times, if different repeat players
favor conflicting positions, legislators may well delegate as a way to avoid affronting
either side. Thus, the best prospects for dictating legislation occur when there is no
instigating crisis and repeat players coalesce around a common policy goal.
The dictation/delegation thesis offers significant advances over the prior
literature. From the securities regulation side, it offers more holistic method for
evaluating legislation. Ribstein’s critique of the political ramifications of boom-andbust financial cycles is powerful but one-sided. Recall that he described a precrash
regulatory equilibrium state in the following way:
[N]ew regulation would not help any distinct group enough to motivate
the group to push for it. Regulated entities therefore have enough clout
to defeat significant increases in liability or regulation. Those who might
shift the balance, such as consumers or investors, do not see a need for
new regulation while they are riding a rising market. 113
Yet in reality, regulation—or deregulation—does occur in boom times, and the
dictation/delegation theory predicts that it will be of a distinctly dictating character.
Particularly if industry’s preferences are unitary and it has the political power to
muscle through legislation in periods of economic expansion, regulatory changes (or,
in the case of securities law, deregulation) that do occur are more likely to be set in
congressional stone.
The dictation/delegation thesis challenges the delegation literature as well,
moving past the generalization that Congress consistently dictates or delegates to
administrative agencies in a given field. To be clear, it is of great interest and importance to be able to characterize the relative amount of delegation to agencies in
the fields of immigration versus consumer-protection legislation, to take but two

negative influence of proxy access on board performance—even though, by the court’s own
account, the agency discounted the studies “because of questions raised by subsequent studies,
limitations acknowledged by the studies’ authors, or [its] own concerns about the studies’
methodology or scope.” Id. at 1151 (alteration in original) (quoting Facilitating Shareholder
Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,762–63 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 200, 232, 240, 249)). One might be forgiven for thinking that the SEC had not
undertaken any study of the subject at all—yet the agency had in fact relied on two empirical
studies, one of which (unlike the studies cited by the court) was published in a respected, peerreviewed journal. See id. at 1151 (noting the studies relied upon by the Commission).
113. Ribstein, supra note 32, at 79.
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examples. Yet it is equally important to understand how and why, within a particular
field, the forces of dictation and delegation modulate over time.
This Part has articulated a theory of dictation and delegation in securities
regulation. What remains is to test it. The remainder of this Article will do so. The
first order of business is to identify and describe the recent history of congressional
securities regulation, grouped in terms of crisis and noncrisis legislation. The time
period begins with SIPA and the Securities Amendments of 1975, which were among
the most far reaching since the 1934 Securities Exchange Act up until that time. I
first describe both the content and the political context of postcrisis securities legislation. I then move to noncrisis securities legislation. With the benefit of this historyin-a-nutshell of securities law, I can describe my methodology for coding instances
of congressional delegation and present my findings.
III. SECURITIES LEGISLATION 1970 TO PRESENT DAY
A. Postcrisis
During the time period of 1970–2014 three crises arose that spurred Congress to
enact new securities laws: the Paperwork Crisis of 1967–70; the accounting fraud
scandals of Enron, WorldCom, and other firms after the bursting of the 2000 internet
stock market bubble; and the financial crisis of 2008.
1. The Paperwork Crisis of 1967–70, the Securities Investor Protection Act of
1970, and the Securities Act Amendments of 1975
The Paperwork Crisis of 1967–70 likely has escaped the attention of most
readers.114 But it nearly crippled Wall Street, and its root cause lay in an utterly mundane problem: paper.
In the 1960s, stock trades required the physical delivery of a stock certificate
—that is, an actual piece of paper.115 “In the 1950s, [the] average daily volume [of
trading] on the New York Stock Exchange had been 2.1 million shares.”116 Then,
during the 1960s, the volume of trading exploded. From 1960 to 1965, average

114. Although a recent Delaware Chancery Court opinion does reference the crisis. See In
re Appraisal of Dell, Inc., No. 9322-VCL, 2015 WL 4313206, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 13, 2015),
as revised (July 30, 2015) (“Increased trading volume in the securities markets overwhelmed
the back offices of brokerage firms and the capabilities of transfer agents. No one could cope
with the burdens of documenting stock trades using paper certificates. The markets were
forced to declare trading holidays so administrators could catch up. With trading volumes
continuing to climb, it was obvious that reform was needed. Congress directed the SEC to
evaluate alternatives that would facilitate trading.”).
115. Adam J. Levitin, The Paper Chase: Securitization, Foreclosure, and the Uncertainty
of Mortgage Title, 63 DUKE L.J. 637, 680–81 (2013).
116. Harvey A. Rowen, The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975: A Legislative History, 3
SEC. REG. L.J. 329, 331 (1976).
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volume doubled to 4.4 million shares per day. 117 By the end of 1967, the total volume
of trading increased 33.3% over the prior year. 118
The existing system simply could not handle this rapid increase in trading volume,
and the situation reached crisis levels: by mid-1967, the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) Board of Governors began closing the exchange early to give members a
chance to deal with the accumulated paperwork. 119 Beginning on January 22 of 1968,
trading was limited to between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. 120 In July and
August of 1968, the NYSE shut down completely—that is, ceased trading altogether—every Wednesday.121 The crisis caused a “wave” of failures of brokerdealers,122 with “over 100 NYSE member firms [going] out of business” between
1968 and 1970.123 Additionally, the NYSE itself spent over $130 million bailing out
firms and their customers.124 A House Committee Report did not mince words in
declaring that the Paperwork Crisis “brought our Nation’s securities market to its
knees.”125
Both the financial and political systems mobilized to respond to the crisis.
Industry members coordinated a technological response, while Congress provided a
federal backstop to reassure the customers of brokerage firms. 126 First, Wall Street
CEOs formed BASIC, the Banking and Securities Industry Committee, to deal with
the crisis.127 Ultimately, they created the Central Certificate Service, the precursor to
the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC), to create a modern
technological solution to the problems that precipitated the Paperwork Crisis. 128
At the same time, and in consultation with the SEC, Congress enacted SIPA,
which created the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC).129 The SIPC
assured investors that, even if their broker-dealer failed, their money was safe, thus
providing insurance to brokerage clients comparable to that provided by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to bank depositors. 130 This quick response to
the crisis served to reassure customers not to abandon broker-dealers entirely. In
addition, the committees with jurisdiction over the securities industry promised
Congress to begin studying the causes of the crisis with an eye toward recommending

117. Id.
118. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., INC., CRISIS IN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY: A CHRONOLOGY:
1967–1970, at 10 (1971), http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45
.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/papers/1970/1971_0730_NYSECrisis.pdf [https://perma.cc
/NHM6-PX4K].
119. Id. at 11.
120. Id. at 12–13.
121. 2 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM J.P.
MORGAN TO THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (1900–1970) 362 (2002).
122. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 464 (3d ed. 2003).
123. MARKHAM, supra note 121, at 364.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Rowen, supra note 116, at 332.
127. CAPITAL MARKETS HANDBOOK § 8.06.k (John C. Burch, Jr. & Bruce S. Foerster eds.,
6th ed. 2016), Westlaw CAPMH.
128. Id.
129. Rowen, supra note 116, at 332.
130. Id.
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further legislation.131 Hearings began in the House in August 1971, and the SEC
convened hearings later that year.132 After five years, these efforts produced the
Securities Amendments of 1975. The buildup to this legislative reform involved
extensive lobbying by both the NYSE and the Securities Industry Association. 133
Along the way, because of a series of scandals concerning the trading of municipal
bonds, provisions that addressed this market were incorporated into the legislative
package.134
The Paperwork Crisis thus prompted not one but two pieces of legislation. The
first, SIPA, came at the end of the crisis and addressed the immediate problem of
reassuring investors that if their broker-dealer failed they would not lose their investments.135 And part of the bargain that produced this limited intervention was a de
facto agreement by the industry that some form of more comprehensive regulation
would follow.
How do these historical developments fit together with the dictation/delegation
thesis? There was little delegation in the SIPA of 1970 and a high degree of
delegation—indeed, the most of any of the acts in the sample time period—in the
Amendments of 1975. This outcome, as Part IV will show, in fact may fit comfortably with the dictation/delegation thesis. SIPA represents the one time in the sample
period where Congress truly acted to stop a crisis as it was unfolding—and it acted
by dictating a concrete solution, the creation of the SIPC. The many delegations of
the later 1975 Amendments reflects the more familiar pattern of heavy delegation
that occurs once the triggering crisis has passed into recent history.
2. Enron, WorldCom, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
Professor Romano’s 2005 article on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“Sarbanes-Oxley”
or SOX) depicts the crisis state that spurred congressional action in these terms:
After declining from July 2001 through shortly before Enron's financial
restatements and collapse in the fall of that year, the market plunged
starting in April 2002, with the S&P reaching bottom in July 2002. The
low point, which represented more than a one-third loss in value of the
index over the preceding year, occurred on the day before the conference
committee reported out a bill (July 23), which was also the second trading day after the bankruptcy filing of WorldCom (it filed on a weekend).
Congress was therefore operating in an environment in which investor
losses were staggering. A subsequent study by the GAO indicated that
one well-known measure of investor sentiment, which was inaugurated
in 1996, was at its lowest recorded level in June and July 2002.136
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Id. at 332.
Romano, supra note 14, at 1546.

456

I N DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 92:435

Enron’s bankruptcy spurred initial legislative efforts, 137 but these stalled.
Subsequent revelations of accounting fraud at Adelphia, Global Crossing, and Tyco
International,138 with the WorldCom scandal as the tipping point, gave fresh impetus
to reform efforts.139
Romano’s critique of SOX posits that Congress legislated in the face of empirical
studies that failed to support important provisions of the Act. 140 She singles out as
examples of congressional “quackery” the following provisions: (1) the prohibition
on company loans to executives, (2) the requirement that audit committees be
independent, (3) the requirement of executive certification of financial statements,
and (4) the ban on the provision of nonaudit services by auditors.141
The dictation/delegation hypothesis does not take any position on the costs and
benefits of these provisions, although in prior work I have questioned the utility of
director “independence.”142 Dictation/delegation simply predicts that SOX, passed
as it was in the wake of a salient crisis, will fall on the delegation end of the spectrum.
The question raised for current purposes by the four provisions highlighted by
Professor Romano is whether they involved Congress in dictating policy, rather than
delegating policy-making authority in a time of crisis. At first blush, these measures
might seem to embody specific congressional policy prescriptions, but that account
is too simplistic.
In fact, in SOX, Congress delegated much of the nitty-gritty implementation of
the Act’s requirements to the SEC and to a new legislatively created entity, the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). For example, with respect to
audit-committee independence (item number two above), the SEC had 270 days to
promulgate rules directing the exchanges to implement their own response to these
requirements.143 Final agency rules elaborated on the meaning of “independence,”144
and they also provided for a transition period,145 exemptions,146 and special rules for
foreign private issuers.147 As for officer certification of financial statements (item
number three), Congress directed the SEC to require by rule each company filing
under the 1934 Act to certify annual or quarterly reports, 148 and the resulting SEC
rule, in contrast to the federal act, treats this subject in detail, specifying which filers
are subject to the requirement (including foreign private issuers, banks and savings
associations, and asset-backed securities issuers), and what “disclosure controls and
procedures” mean.149 As for the prohibition on nonaudit services by auditors (item

137. Id. at 1558.
138. Id. at 1545.
139. See Coffee, supra note 35, at 1036.
140. Romano, supra note 14, at 1526–27.
141. Id. at 1529–43.
142. Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 449 (2008).
143. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775–76.
144. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b)(1) (2016).
145. See § 240.10A-3(a)(5) (providing varying compliance deadlines for “foreign private
issuers and smaller reporting companies” compared to “other listed issuers”).
146. § 240.10A-3(b)(1)(iv).
147. § 240.10A-3(b)(1)(iv)(C)–(E).
148. § 302(a), 116 Stat. at 777.
149. Management’s Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification
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number four), Congress itself enacted a laundry list of prohibited activities, but also
delegated to the PCAOB the power to identify “any other services that the Board
determines, by regulation, [to be] impermissible.” 150 The SEC did not take up
Congress’s invitation to create new categories of forbidden nonaudit services, but—
consistent with Congress’s delegation of rule-making authority—it did elaborate on
many of the congressionally established categories. 151
With regard to the executive-loan prohibition (item number one), that restriction
stemmed from a problem specific to WorldCom: using company stock as collateral,
WorldCom’s CEO, Bernie Ebbers, had borrowed millions of dollars to fund enterprises ranging from a Canadian cattle ranch to a trucking company to a minor league
hockey team.152 As WorldCom stock began to sink, his lenders pressured him to sell
the stock, and the board authorized the corporation to loan Ebbers money to prevent
a sell-off that would lower the stock price still further. 153 Congress responded by
prohibiting company loans to executives—and in doing so created problems for company practices as routine as advancing newly hired executives money for relocation
expenses.154
Thus, while Congress might have fashioned SOX in a manner unsupported by
empirical data, it delegated many matters of implementation to the SEC. Nor is this
assertion new or controversial. Other scholars have noted that the 2002 Congress
“painted with a broad brush”155 and left the SEC with “extensive rulemaking

of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636 (June 18, 2003) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228, 240, 249, 270, 274).
150. § 201(a), 116 Stat. at 772.
151. For example, where Congress merely listed “actuarial services” in 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j-1(g)(4) (2012), the SEC’s final rule specifies the following:
Any actuarially-oriented advisory service involving the determination of
amounts recorded in the financial statements and related accounts for the audit
client other than assisting a client in understanding the methods, models, assumptions, and inputs used in computing an amount, unless it is reasonable to conclude
that the results of these services will not be subject to audit procedures during an
audit of the audit client's financial statements.
17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(iv) (2016).
152. See Ken Belson, WorldCom’s Audacious Failure and Its Toll on an Industry, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/18/business/worldcoms-audacious
-failure-and-its-toll-on-an-industry.html [https://perma.cc/47U3-BWH7].
153. See generally Floyd Norris, A Crime So Large It Changed the Law, N.Y. TIMES
(July 14, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/14/business/a-crime-so-large-it-changed
-the-law.html [https://perma.cc/S4G4-A8TS] (“Mr. Ebbers did not sell shares in his company
in the months before it collapsed. . . . The reluctance to sell stock was part of the corporate
culture he instilled at WorldCom, where selling shares was frowned upon as showing a lack
of confidence in the company.”).
154. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Unintended Issues Under Sarbanes-Oxley, DAILY REP. (Sept.
26, 2002), http://www.dailyreportonline.com/id=900005532398/Unintended-Issues-Under
-SarbanesOxley [https://perma.cc/FBP7-7X2V].
155. Steven J. Cleveland, The NYSE As State Actor?: Rational Actors, Behavioral Insights
& Joint Investigations, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 74–75 (2005).
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powers.”156 Indeed, as John Paul Lucci has detailed, Congress left the SEC with
instructions to:
(1) develop accounting standards under new Section 13(b) of the
Securities Act; (2) define by rule prohibited non-auditing services; (3)
prohibit the listing of companies on exchanges that do not comply with
provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley; (4) develop procedures for CEO
certification of financials; (5) clarify prohibited trades during blackout
periods; (6) promulgate rules of professional responsibility for attorneys
appearing before the commission; (7) develop rules for the treatment of
“off-balance sheet transactions;” (8) require pro forma financial information to be filed with periodic reports; (9) require internal control reports; (10) report whether the company has developed internal ethics
rules; (11) require disclosure of whether an audit committee has “at least
1 member who is a financial expert;” (12) develop rules for handling
conflicts of interest involving security analysts; (13) define terms in certain circumstances; and (14) require document retention. 157
Thus, while SOX may have breathed life into corporate governance proposals that
lacked empirical support, it delegated much of the implementation to the SEC.
3. The Financial Crisis of 2008 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010
The financial crisis of 2008 began with rumblings in 2007 about the failure of two
Bear Stearns hedge funds158 and the bankruptcy of subprime mortgage lender New
Century.159 In 2008 a series of high-stakes events made clear that these failures were
not isolated phenomena. JP Morgan Chase bought Bear Stearns with federal assistance,160 and the federal government took over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 161
Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. 162 AIG received federal assistance.163

156. Barbara Black, Protecting the Retail Investor in an Age of Financial Uncertainty, 35
U. DAYTON L. REV. 61, 65 (2009).
157. John Paul Lucci, Enron—The Bankruptcy Heard Around the World and the
International Ricochet of Sarbanes-Oxley, 67 ALB. L. REV. 211, 232–33 (2003) (footnotes
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158. Bess Levin, The Fall of Bear Stearns: A Quickie Guide, N.Y. MAG.: DAILY
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[https://perma.cc/3G65-TFNT].
160. Levin, supra note 158.
161. Neil Irwin & Zachary A. Goldfarb, U.S. Seizes Control of Mortgage Giants, WASH.
POST (Sept. 8, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/07
/AR2008090700259.html [https://perma.cc/265E-RDUX].
162. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill Is Sold, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/15lehman.html [https://perma.cc/3NW4-THHD].
163. Matthew Karnitschnig, Deborah Solomon, Liam Plevin & Jon E. Hilsenrath, U.S. To
Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2008, 11:59 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122156561931242905
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Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, the last two independent banks, converted to
bank holding companies so that they could receive greater federal assistance. 164
Washington Mutual collapsed,165 the stock market lost fifty-four percent of its value
in less than eighteen months,166 and the nation entered the “Great Recession.”167
On July 10, 2010, Congress responded by passing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act. 168 The stated purpose of Dodd-Frank was
“[t]o promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability
and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the
American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial
services practices, and for other purposes.”169 Each of Dodd-Frank’s goals was ambitious. Together they represented a sweeping and tremendously complicated
undertaking. The dictation/delegation theory predicts a high amount of delegation
after any crisis. Given the crippling economic crisis of 2008 and the scope of the
2010 reforms, it is unsurprising that Dodd-Frank in fact contained a large number of
delegations. Indeed, it called for 398 rule makings from fifteen different agencies.170
Congress delegated more to the agencies than they could reasonably handle. In
April of 2011, nine months after the enactment of Dodd-Frank, only 5.4% of the rules
had been finalized, and all twenty-six of the rule-making deadlines for that month
were missed.171 By July of 2011, regulators had only completed thirty-three, or 20%,
of the 163 required rule makings mandated by Congress in that time frame.172 In July
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alone, 104 deadlines were missed, and only thirteen rule-making requirements were
finalized.173 Only 25.5% of the deadlines were met by the end of 2011. 174 And by
July 2012, the two-year anniversary of Dodd-Frank, 140 (63%) of the 221 rulemaking deadlines had been missed, while eighty-one deadlines had been met.175
(Additionally, only 119 of the 398 required rule makings were finalized, and 142
rule-making requirements had yet to be proposed.)176 By the end of the fourth quarter
of 2014, four and a half years after the passage of Dodd-Frank, 231 of the 398 total
required rule makings had been finalized, “while 94 (23.62%) rulemaking requirements [had] not yet been proposed.”177
One example of these delays is the Volcker Rule, which deals with a ban on
banks’ proprietary trading. Regulators presented a proposed form of the Volcker
Rule on October 12, 2011,178 and then gave the public until February 13, 2012, to
comment on the proposed draft of the regulations.179 Ultimately they received over
17,000 comments.180 This torrent of public input led to more analysis and discussion
by the agencies, and the final rule was not released until December 10, 2013,181 over
a year after the July 21, 2012, due date.182 However, much of this rule is still not in
effect. On December 18, 2014, “the Federal Reserve extended the Volcker Rule’s
conformance period for ‘legacy covered funds’ [a defined term] until July 21, 2016
and indicated it would likely extend [that] period” for yet another year.183 The Federal
Reserve also allowed delay until 2017 for collateralized loan obligations and the
provision of the Volcker Rule that bans banks from placing their own money in risky
hedge and private equity funds.184
The dictation/delegation thesis suggests that in times of crisis Congress will
delegate more policy work to administrative agencies. Part IV will test this hypothesis, but first we turn to the other side of the legislative coin—noncrisis legislation.
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B. Noncrisis Legislation
Congress does sometimes act in the securities arena in the absence of crisis.
Indeed, no salient crises spurred five modern instances of congressional action. And
notably, in four of these five instances, the impetus for legislation came largely from
Silicon Valley.
1. The Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980 (SBIIA)
The economy of the 1970s was not prosperous: the decade in fact saw a business
downturn, double-digit inflation, and a recession. But there was no crisis that
prompted the enactment of the SBIIA; the pressures for enactment came from another source.
Beginning in the early 1970s, private equity firms made the claim that the
Investment Company Act of 1940, which, among other things, required that a fund
have no more than 100 beneficial owners, 185 limited their ability to raise capital. 186
In particular, one venture capital fund, Heizer Corporation, lobbied Congress to address this problem by allowing formation of business development corporations
(BDCs).187 Congress responded in 1980 by passing SBIIA and thus creating BDCs,
“publicly traded closed-end funds that make investments in private [or thinly traded]
public companies” in the form of long-term debt or equity capital, with the goal of
generating capital appreciation.188 Significantly, Congress made all but one of the
1980 Amendments effective immediately. 189

185. Doug Cornelius, Qualified Purchasers Under the Investment Company Act,
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Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
96th Cong. 243–50 (1979) [hereinafter SBIIA Hearing] (statement of E.F. Heizer, Chairman
and President, Heizer Corporation, asking Congress to pass SBIIA).
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189. Only Title V of SBIIA explicitly set an effective date. Small Business Investment
Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 507, 94 Stat. 2275, 2294 (1980). Interestingly,
Title I of SBIIA, which concerns the BDCs, has the most delegations (eleven, all permissive)
of any title of the Act. Id. at §§ 101–05, 94 Stat. at 2275–89. Upon further analysis, however,
these delegations are of relatively minor points. Id. The Act articulates two specific ways a
firm can qualify as a BDC and then grants the power to the SEC to, by rule, articulate further
paths to BDC status. The other permissive delegations leave it to the SEC to hash out details
of minimal importance. For example, Congress specifies that beneficial ownership in the case
of legal separation, divorce, or death remains with the transferor, “pursuant to such rules and

462

I N DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 92:435

Part IV will consider the SBIIA in detail, but a key point is worth noting here: in
the midst of debate on the Hill, the dictation/delegation thesis played out in a
remarkably explicit way. The SEC resisted industry efforts to secure new legislation,
with Commissioner Philip Loomis arguing that “our position is that the bill in its
present form is not needed because the goals can be accomplished—indeed, may
already have been largely accomplished administratively—without further legislation.”190 Arthur Little, President of the National Association of Small Business
Investment Companies (NASBIC) and CEO of Narragansett Capital Corporation,
vehemently disagreed:
[NASBIC] and others appearing before you today feel that the time
for Congress to act on our Investment Company Act problem is long
overdue. We have repeatedly come to Congress for legislative relief and
been shunted back to the SEC for administrative relief which has been
promised but never forthcoming, on at least those four occasions that I
mentioned.191
He urged Congress to act “once and for all” and to no longer listen to “the repeated
assurances of the [SEC].”192
It is unclear whether the SBIIA succeeded in its goals; indeed, some deemed it a
failure.193 Only seven companies had elected to be regulated as business development
companies by August 1981, and by 1982 only two such companies had gone public.194 One of those two companies was the selfsame Heizer Corporation that had
lobbied on behalf of the amendments. 195 One commentator has gone so far as to
describe the SBIIA as “the Heizer amendments to the Investment Company Act.”196
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190. SBIIA Hearing, supra note 187, at 35 (statement of Phillip A. Loomis, Comm’r,
Securities and Exchange Commission).
191. Id. at 132 (statement of Arthur D. Little, President-Elect, National Association of
Small Business Investment Companies).
192. Id. at 131.
193. See Duke K. Bristow & Lee R. Petillon, Public Venture Capital Funds: New Relief
from the Investment Company Act of 1940, 18 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 393, 399 (1999).
194. Reginald L. Thomas & Paul F. Roye, Regulation of Business Development Companies
Under the Investment Company Act, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 895, 935 (1982).
195. Howitt, supra note 186.
196. Joseph W. Bartlett, Another New Paradigm: Multiplex Capital Fund—A Quick and
Expensive Way To Get into Action, VC EXPERTS (May 2013), https://vcexperts.com
/buzz_articles/1360 [https://perma.cc/A9GD-DFJX].
Heizer was apparently playing both the dictation and delegation game simultaneously. SEC
Associate Director of Investments Lybecker:
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The episode illustrates that sometimes not just an industry, but one or two particular
firms, can find success in Congress—including success in the form of preempting
agency control of a regulatory field.
2. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) & Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA)
In 1994 House Speaker Newt Gingrich built a national political campaign around
a so-called contract with America.197 That campaign was successful and Republican
majorities took control of the House and Senate in 1995.198 One major focus of
Republican lawmakers involved securities class actions. Reform efforts grew out of
two main concerns. First, critics argued that securities class actions were simply too
easy to file and triggered a lengthy and costly discovery process. 199 Pre-PSLRA
abuses included plaintiffs’ attorneys reportedly filing cut-and-paste complaints the
day after the price of a security dropped.200
The second criticism was that these strike suits disproportionately harmed
emerging high-technology companies,201 “because they were risky enterprises subject to fluctuations in sales and revenues and, therefore, volatile stock prices.” 202
Faced with the costs of extensive discovery, these companies often settled meritless
suits to avoid a protracted and costly defense. 203 Silicon Valley companies thus

However, and I hope this is not speaking out of turn, we have been dealing with
one of the people scheduled to testify later in your hearings, Mr. Heizer and his
attorneys, in processing a draft application they intend to file for exemptive relief
under the Investment Company Act, and we have worked out an approach to the
upstream affiliate problem under section 17 that goes well beyond what we have
done for all registered companies to take care of those problems inherent in
venture capital companies.
SBIIA Hearing, supra note 187, at 74 (statement of Martin E. Lybecker, Associate Director,
Division of Investment Management, Securities and Exchange Commission).
197. Katherine Q. Seelye, The 1994 Campaign: The Republicans; with Fiery Words,
Gingrich Builds His Kingdom, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 27, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/10
/27/us/the-1994-campaign-the-republicans-with-fiery-words-gingrich-builds-his-kingdom.html
[https://perma.cc/A3E2-PBSA].
198. See Joel Seligman, The Private Securities Reform Act of 1995, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 717,
718 (1996) (“After the Republican party gained control of both houses of Congress in the 1994
elections, the movement for private securities litigation reform took on a new urgency. On
January 4, 1995, H.R. 10, the ‘Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of 1995,’ was introduced
in the House, with five sponsors and 115 cosponsors. The original bill, drafted by California
Congressman Christopher Cox, had its origins in one of the ten planks of the Republican
party’s 1994 election campaign Contract with America.” (footnote omitted)).
199. See Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the
Effect of the PSLRA’s Internal-Information Standard on ’33 and ’34 Act Claims, 76 WASH. U.
L.Q. 537, 553 (1998) (“This ease in filing, they claimed, was resulting in strike suits.”).
200. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 730.
201. See Sale, supra note 199, at 555 (“[T]hose pressing for reform argued that start-up
companies, primarily emerging high-technology companies, were hardest hit by strike suits.”).
202. Id.
203. Id.
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combined forces with accounting firms and venture capital firms in an effort to secure
new rules,204 producing “one of the most successful lobbying campaigns in the
history of the Republic.”205 The PSLRA legislation imposed heightened pleading
standards (including as to the defendant’s state of mind) and putting off discovery
until resolution of any motion to dismiss. 206
Following the PSLRA’s passage, both its proponents and opponents expected that
it would cause a decrease in the number of securities class actions.207 Yet the number
of federal securities class-action lawsuits, while dipping in the year following
PSLRA’s passage, did not significantly decrease; indeed, the number of securities
fraud complaints filed against companies reached its high point in 1998.208 One
explanation was that plaintiffs with less meritorious claims reacted to the PSLRA by
funneling claims into state court. The empirics supporting this claim were mixed, 209
but advocates of SLUSA, which federally preempted state law securities claims, argued that PSLRA created “an explosion of cases being brought in state courts.” 210
One analysis ascribes the impetus behind SLUSA to an ongoing fight between
Silicon Valley and the plaintiff’s bar—and one particular attorney, William S.
Lerach.211 Lerach, an infamous plaintiffs’ attorney who was later sentenced to two
years in prison for charges involving paying “professional plaintiffs,” 212 was described as “the most feared of the class-action lawyers for plaintiffs.” 213 After the
1995 passage of the PSLRA, he championed California Proposition 211, which
“would have made it easier for investors . . . to file securities-fraud [suits] against

204. See Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking “Substantive Rights” (in the Rules Enabling Act)
More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 51–52 (1998) (“The PSLRA . . . was a direct
result of lobbying efforts by accounting firms, securities firms, and high-tech industry . . . .”);
see also Brian Cheffins, John Armour & Bernard Black, Delaware Corporate Litigation and
the Fragmentation of the Plaintiffs’ Bar, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 427, 449 (2012) (citing
the PSLRA as a result of the “backlash” to a surge in securities litigation aimed at, among
others, high-tech companies); Manning Gilbert Warren III, Federalism and Investor
Protection: Constitutional Restraints on Preemption of State Remedies for Securities Fraud,
60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 170 (1997) (arguing that the lobbying effort of a coalition
including Silicon Valley overwhelmed interests “representing rank and file investors” in the
passage of the PSLRA).
205. Benjamin J. Stein, Next Stop the Statehouse, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1995, at F11,
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/31/business/viewpoint-next-stop-the-statehouse.html [https://
perma.cc/U356-HPQQ].
206. Sale, supra note 199, at 557–58 (outlining the law’s heightened requirements of
plaintiffs).
207. Lisa L. Casey, Shutting the Doors to State Court: The Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998, 27 SEC. REG. L. J. 141, 152 (1999).
208. Id. at 154.
209. (and suffered from unreliable data). See id. at 166–70.
210. Id. at 173.
211. Leslie Eaton, The Silicon Valley Gang; An Influential Industry with Lots of Money Is
Getting Its Way on Capitol Hill, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998
/06/11/business/silicon-valley-gang-influential-industry-with-lots-money-getting-its-way-capitol
.html [https://perma.cc/QS5J-68YF].
212. Lisa L. Casey, Class Action Criminality, 34 J. CORP. L. 153, 175–76 (2008).
213. Eaton, supra note 211.
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[California] companies.”214 In response, Silicon Valley companies and venture
capitalists organized a $40 million campaign and successfully defeated the measure.215 Silicon Valley then turned to Congress to “make sure” it would never face “a
similar threat, in California or anywhere else.” 216 A New York Times investigation
suggested that millions of dollars in Silicon Valley campaign contributions
—“includ[ing] $150,000 to members of the Senate Banking Committee, which
handled the litigation legislation but otherwise has little involvement in technology
issues”—persuaded lawmakers to support SLUSA. 217 The article also implies that
the power of Silicon Valley explains why Arthur Levitt Jr., “the politically astute
chairman of the S.E.C., . . . reversed himself and agreed to support the litigation bill
on the day his renomination was taken up by the Senate Banking Committee.”218
Whatever the reason for its passage, SLUSA successfully preempted state securities
claims, funneling them instead to federal court and the more stringent rules PSLRA
had earlier imposed. Both the PSLRA and SLUSA delegated very little to the SEC.
3. The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA)
NSMIA sheds light on another dynamic in the political economy of securities
regulation: namely, the role of the states. In NSMIA, the mutual fund industry, small
issuers, and the SEC joined together in supporting federal preemption of the
patchwork of state rules that imposed reporting and other requirements on mutual
fund operators. State regulation was problematic because each state imposed differing requirements on funds. And these problems were particularly acute because some
states imposed merit-based regulation of fund offerings, departing sharply from the
disclosure-centered model of federal regulation. 219
There was an uneasy alliance between the SEC and industry members that backed
federal preemption of state regulation. While one initial impetus for NSMIA came
from a 1992 SEC study,220 the other driver was a newly Republican Congress, which
had recently enacted the PSLRA and was eager to continue to deregulate securities

214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See Paul S. Stevens & Craig S. Tyle, Mutual Funds, Investment Advisers, and the
National Securities Markets Improvement Act, 52 BUS. LAW. 419, 428–29 (1997) (“Because
such state laws were adopted to protect investors from making imprudent investments, they
generally were designed to regulate the merits of securities offerings. The Securities Act, on
the other hand, was not designed to protect investors from imprudent investments; instead, it
aimed to safeguard investors from making uninformed investment decisions.” (footnote
omitted)).
220. Id. at 427–28 (“Although the NSMIA by no means included all of the staff's
recommendations in the 1992 Study, the study did provide the first impetus for the amendments adopted in 1996, including the liberalization of mutual fund advertising and a new
exception from the Investment Company Act for investment companies whose securities are
owned exclusively by ‘qualified purchasers.’”).
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law.221 In 1995, Representative Jack Fields (R-TX) introduced the “Capital Markets
Deregulation and Liberalization Act,” or the “Fields Bill.” 222 A popular press article
asserted that Republicans were “gunning” for the SEC with this bill, which reduced
the number of SEC Commissioners from five to three 223 and cut its budget by twenty
percent.224 Some observers speculated that Fields had gone too far, alarming the very
Wall Street backers he had sought to court. In any event, the final version of the
NSMIA bill eliminated these cutbacks aimed at the SEC. That bill also introduced a
new requirement that the SEC consider the promotion of efficiency and capital formation, as well as investor protection, when engaging in rule making.225
No matter how strained the SEC-Republican alliance might have been, they faced
a common adversary: the fifty states, which were intent on defending their regulatory
turf. Leading the state-protecting charge was the powerful North American Securities
Administrators Association (NASAA), the organization of state securities-law
administrators.226 But the efforts of the NASAA were largely unavailing. In particular, the NSMIA as enacted provided for almost total federal preemption of state
mutual-fund regulation.
In an instance of clear dictation, Title I of NSMIA provides that “covered
securities” are exempt from state regulation of securities offerings, and if a security
is “issued by an investment company that is registered, or that has filed a registration
statement, under the Investment Company Act of 1940,” then it is a covered security.227 Lest there be any doubt, this provision’s heading is “exclusive federal
registration of investment companies.” The federal preemption, “[p]robably the most
significant provision” of NSMIA, took effect immediately upon signing. 228
To be sure, the NASAA had some success: it successfully lobbied to continue to
receive notice filings and to maintain the capacity to receive fees from fund
offerings.229 But “the primary effect is to prohibit states from performing the

221. Jennifer J. Johnson, Private Placements: A Regulatory Black Hole, 35 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 151, 159 n.41 (2010).
222. Bill Atkinson, Securities Laws Face Closest Look Since ’33 Fields’ Bill Seeks To
Preempt State Oversight, BALT. SUN (Nov. 12, 1995), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1995-11
-12/business/1995316045_1_investors-rounsaville-investment-advisers [https://perma.cc/9AQF
-TRDA]; see Michael Schroeder, Guess Who’s Gunning for the SEC, BLOOMBERG. (Aug. 13,
1995, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/1995-08-13/guess-whos-gunning-for
-the-sec [https://perma.cc/953X-6MT5].
223. Schroeder, supra note 222.
224. Johnson, supra note 221, at 188.
225. Before NSMIA, the SEC’s charge had been to see that its rules were “necessary or
appropriate in the public interest,” and to consider whether they protect investors. James D.
Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting the D.C. Circuit's
Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1811, 1818 (2012). Over time
courts have used the language NSMIA introduced to review SEC rule making more strictly,
most notably in the Business Roundtable case on proxy access. Id. at 1812–13.
226. See Stevens & Tyle, supra note 219, at 432; see also NORTH AM. SEC. ADMINS. ASS’N,
http://www.nasaa.org/ [https://perma.cc/68GE-NURV].
227. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 102(a),
110 Stat. 3416, 3418.
228. Stevens & Tyle, supra note 219, at 446.
229. Id.
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‘gatekeeper’ function they previously exercised over investment company
registration statements.”230
NSMIA also imposed federal requirements on broker-dealers and financial
advisors. As the final law attests, interest groups differed in their success in achieving
their goals of preemption in the face of state opposition. Small issuers did not fare as
well as did the mutual funds. Professor Rutheford B. Campbell applies public choice
theory to conclude that the mutual fund industry and the state securities regulators,
as cohesive interest groups, were able to protect their interests in NSMIA in a way
that small issuers were not. Professor Campbell observes that “the millions of small
issuers, who in total seemingly had more to gain or lose than either the mutual fund
industry or the individual state administrators,” lacked the political clout of mutual
funds or the NASAA, and “received essentially nothing from the legislation.” 231
Thus—in stark contrast to mutual fund operators—they remained subject to a
patchwork of state regulations, without the benefit of federal preemption.
Professor Jennifer Johnson has argued that this reform was misguided. Another
provision in NSMIA provided for total federal preemption of private placements. As
she explains, most witnesses in the congressional hearings testified that the states
should retain a role in private-placement disclosure regulation.232 The overarching
goal of NSMIA was to eliminate duplicative dual federal and state registration, but
small private placements—those that were not national in scope—did not qualify
because the federal government effectively exerted no regulatory authority over
them. This preemption provision thus created a “regulatory black hole.” 233 In
explaining this outcome, Professor Johnson points out that representatives from the
securities industry “dominated” the list of witnesses at the NSMIA hearings.234 And
these industries did more than just testify. Johnson reports on over $220,000 in
contributions from industry PACs to Representative Fields in the two years prior to
his introduction of the Fields Bill.235

230. Id.
231. Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Impact of NSMIA on Small Issuers, 53 BUS. LAW.
575, 585 (1998).
232. Johnson, supra note 221, at 159.
233. Id. at 161.
234. Including the Investment Company Institute (ICI), Securities Industry Association,
the Public Securities Association, the American Bankers Association, the Managed Futures
Association, the National Venture Capital Association, and the Investment Counsel
Association. Id. at 186–87.
235. [S]ecurities, banking, and insurance political action committees contributed
more than $220,000 to Representative Fields in the two years leading up to the
Fields Bill’s attempt to deregulate vast portions of the securities market. Top
contributors included JP Morgan, Citicorp, First Boston, Nations Bank, Merrill
Lynch, the American Bankers Association, Goldman Sachs, and the ICI.
Similarly, House Commerce Committee Chairman, Representative Thomas
Bliley, a Republican from Virginia, received tens of thousands of dollars from
industry PACs. Data maintained by The Center for Responsive Politics indicates
that from 1994-1996, PACs associated with the finance and insurance and real
estate sector contributed $400,000 to Representative Fields (nearly 4x the
contributions he received in the previous election cycle) and $100,816 to
Representative Bliley. During this same time period, these PACs contributed
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How does NSMIA square with the dictation/delegation thesis? Mutual fund
operators achieved their first-best goal by securing federal preemption for their
industry. To be sure, with that federal preemption came attendant agency delegation.
But in context that outcome was not surprising, even though it involved a noncrisis
related delegation of governance power. For one, an SEC study prompted the act,
and it is to be expected that ensuing legislation would enhance SEC discretion. Moreover, the mutual fund industry backed the legislation, even with its delegation of
power, because that delegation was far preferable to the status quo ante. In exchange
for an exemption from regulation by fifty separate state securities regulation regimes,
a modest empowerment of the SEC was a small price to pay.
4. The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 (JOBS Act)
The JOBS Act represents the most fundamental reform of securities regulation
since 1975—arguably since 1934. I classify it as noncrisis regulation even though,
to be sure, the pre-JOBS Act economy was in bad shape. But the 2008 financial crisis,
three years in the past, was no longer salient. Certainly no immediate scandal
prompted the JOBS Act. To the extent that the economy was suffering in 2011, there
was no clear reason why legislators should look to securities regulation—as opposed
to financial stimulus or tax policy—as the logical response. For these reasons, the
JOBS Act is best viewed as noncrisis regulation. And because it is relatively recent
and its story has not been told elsewhere, this section delves deeply into the legislation’s origins.
In 2010 the nation remained in the grip of the recession catalyzed by the financial
crisis of 2008. Unemployment was high. 236 The American public voiced its discontent with President Obama and the Democrats in power in the 2010 mid-term
elections. In that “historic” wave, Republicans gained 63 House seats, the largest
gain in one party’s power since the 1940s.237 In response, the Republican House
Speaker John Boehner claimed a “mandate” to shrink the federal government’s
reach.238
In his State of the Union address on January 25, 2011, President Obama signaled
a new willingness to deregulate. “To reduce barriers to growth and investment,” he
declared, “I’ve ordered a review of Government regulations. When we find rules that

$450,988 to Alfonse M. D’Amato, a Republican, who chaired the Senate
Banking Committee from 1995-1998.
Id. at 186 n.207 (citation omitted).
236. See Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 [https://perma.cc/CRT28BUB] (showing unemployment in January of 2010 just below ten percent).
237. Michael Barone, No Republican Wave in House Elections; It Already Occurred, in
2010, WASH. EXAMINER (Sept. 4, 2014, 9:53 PM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com
/no-republican-wave-in-house-elections-it-already-occurred-in-2010/article/2552888 [https://
perma.cc/WD3L-5YKW].
238. Republicans Capture House in Historic Wave, Claim ‘Mandate’ To Shrink
Government, FOX NEWS (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/11/03
/republicans-capture-house-historic-wave-make-gains-senate/ [https://perma.cc/KC9Y-CTHN].
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put an unnecessary burden on businesses, we will fix them.” 239 He termed this new
program “Startup America.”240
Part V.B. will delve into the interests that backed specific titles of the JOBS Act,
but the catalyst for its passage was Title I, the so-called “IPO on-ramp.” Title I was
the brainchild of Kate Mitchell, a venture capitalist with Scale Venture Partners and
outgoing chairman of the National Venture Capital Association, who was instrumental in the passage of the entire JOBS Act. 241
In March of 2011 Mitchell participated in a conference at the Treasury
Department called, “Access to Capital: Fostering Growth and Innovation for Small
Companies.”242 “During a break [in the meeting], Mitchell ducked into an empty
room with Greg Becker, CEO of Silicon Valley Bank; Steven Bochner, partner at
Palo Alto law firm Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati; [and] Carter Mack, president
of San Francisco investment bank JMP Group.”243 They created an ad hoc group
called the IPO Task Force, made up of “entrepreneurs, bankers, accountants,
academics, and investors” to discuss changes in the IPO process.244 They also invited
lobbyists for NYSE Euronext and the National Venture Capital Association to offer
advice.245
As the IPO Task Force went about its work in the summer of 2011, the United

239. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 48, 53 (Jan. 25, 2011).
240. Fact Sheet: White House Launches “Startup America” Initiative, WHITE HOUSE,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/startup-america-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/V3UF-EKS5].
241. James Freeman, Kate Mitchell: How Silicon Valley Won in Washington, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 6,
2012, 10:23 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303299604577326270090887812
[https://web.archive.org/web/20160117002246/http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230329
9604577326270090887812].
242. Zachary M. Seward, The JOBS Act Turns 1—and It’s an Utter Failure, ATLANTIC
(Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/04/the-jobs-act-turns-1-and
-its-an-utter-failure/274732 [https://perma.cc/7FDV-YPZ7].
243. Id.
244. Phil Mattingly & Robert Schmidt, Startup Act Shows Silicon Valley Clout Growing
in DC, BLOOMBERG (May 31, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05
-31/startup-act-shows-silicon-valley-clout-growing-in-dc.html [https://web.archive.org/web
/20130914024925/http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-31/startup-act-shows-silicon-valley
-clout-growing-in-dc.html]. Three IPO Task Force members were venture capitalists: Kate
Mitchell (chair), Mark Gorenberg (Hummer Winblad Partners), and Tom Crotty (Battery
Ventures). Three were “Public Investors”: Jeff Cardon & Karey Barker (Wasatch Advisors)
and Henry Ellenbogen (T. Rowe Price). Three were entrepreneurs: Magid Abraham (CEO,
Comscore), Josh James (former CEO, Omniture), and Desh Deshpande (former CEO and cofounder, Cascade Communications & Sycamore Networks). Two were securities lawyers: Joel
Trotter (Latham & Watkins) and Steve Bochner (Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati). Three
were academics or accountants: Bill Sahlman (Harvard Business School), Carol Stacey (S.E.C.
Institute), and Chuck Roberl (retired head of PWC Tech Practice). Four were investment
bankers: Paul Deninger (Evercore), Carter Mack (JMP Securities), and Brent Gledhill & Brett
Paschke (William Blair). IPO Task Force, Rebuilding the IPO On-Ramp 3 (Oct. 20, 2011),
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/ipotaskforceslides.pdf [https://perma.cc/42Q7-SA97]
(slideshow accompanying IPO Task Force report).
245. Id.
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States was in the midst of a crisis regarding the debt ceiling. 246 The government
approached statutory limits on the amount it could borrow, and some Republicans
advocated refusal to put in place a new and elevated debt ceiling.247 On July 31, two
days before the preexisting ceiling was to be reached, Congress struck a
compromise.248 Even so, just five days later, on August 5, 2011, Standard & Poors
downgraded the credit rating of the United States from AAA to AA+. 249
The following month, on August 8, 2011, President Obama signaled a willingness
to engage with Republicans on the economy:
These aren’t Democratic proposals. These aren’t big government proposals. These are all ideas that traditionally Republicans have agreed
to . . . countless times in the past. . . .
....
Markets will rise and fall, but this is the United States of America. No
matter what some agency may say, we’ve always been and always will
be a AAA country. For all of the challenges we face, we continue to have
the best universities, some of the most productive workers, the most
innovative companies, the most adventurous entrepreneurs on Earth.250
As these events unfolded, new Republican-backed bills were introduced, focusing
on everything from raising the threshold for private companies to go public to easing
restrictions on capital raising.251
On October 20, 2011, the IPO Task Force issued a report titled “Rebuilding the
IPO On-Ramp: Putting Emerging Companies and the Job Market Back on the Road
to Growth.”252 When Silicon Valley companies began pushing for Title I, many

246. See Glenn Kessler, Explaining the Debt Ceiling Debate, WASH. POST: FACT
CHECKER (June 29, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/explaining
-the-debt-ceiling-debate/2011/06/28/AGVM80pH_blog.html [https://perma.cc/LLU9-W6DX]
(summarizing the crisis).
247. See id. (attributing such a position to Rep. Michele Bachmann and Sen. Jim DeMint,
among others).
248. Carl Hulse & Helene Cooper, Obama and Leaders Reach Debt Deal, N.Y. TIMES
(July 31, 2011) http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/01/us/politics/01FISCAL.html [https://perma
.cc/WXS5-AWEL].
249. Zachary A. Goldfarb, S&P Downgrades U.S. Credit Rating for First Time, WASH.
POST (Aug. 6, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/sandp-considering
-first-downgrade-of-us-credit-rating/2011/08/05/gIQAqKeIxI_story.html [https://perma.cc
/R29D-TX8G].
250. Remarks on the National Economy, 2 PUB. PAPERS 933, 934 (Aug. 8, 2011).
251. See generally Susan Jones, Republicans Remind Obama: Democrats Are Blocking
House-Passed Jobs Bills, CNS NEWS (Sept. 7, 2011, 6:10 AM), http://cnsnews.com/news
/article/republicans-remind-obama-democrats-are-blocking-house-passed-jobs-bills [https://
perma.cc/H8TF-TVML] (describing unpassed bills, including the Consumer Financial
Protection & Soundness Improvement Act, the Reducing Regulatory Burdens Act, and the
Clean Water Cooperative Federalism Act, among others that would have reduced regulations
relating to capital raising, etc.).
252. IPO TASK FORCE, REBUILDING THE IPO ON-RAMP: PUTTING EMERGING COMPANIES
AND THE JOB MARKET BACK ON THE ROAD TO GROWTH (2011), http://www.sec.gov/info
/smallbus/acsec/rebuilding_the_ipo_on-ramp.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5UU-27ZX].
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Republican candidates saw it as an opportunity to convince these companies and their
employees to begin contributing to Republican campaigns. 253 Steve Case, of
Revolution LLC, joined President Obama’s new Council on Jobs and
Competitiveness and also agreed to serve as chairman of the Startup America
Partnership.254 Case also made sure to keep contact with Republicans, advising Eric
Cantor, the House Majority Leader, on proposals aimed at reducing rules and taxes
on technology and start-up firms.255
The JOBS Act ultimately adopted two of the IPO Task Force’s three
recommendations nearly whole cloth: first, providing an “on-ramp” for emerging
growth companies with annual gross revenues of less than $1 billion, and second,
loosening restrictions on the ability of companies pre-IPO to communicate to
investors.256
In October 2011, Case met with Cantor.257 Cantor began encouraging House
Republicans to strengthen their ties to technology firms. 258 During this time he also
contacted “capital and private equity funds in Silicon Valley, Boston, the research
triangle in North Carolina[,] and . . . Virginia. . . . ask[ing] for ideas and support.”259
Cantor, Representative Kevin McCarthy of California, and Representative Paul Ryan
of Wisconsin worked together to make Silicon Valley connections. 260 Some of the
notable companies they met with included Facebook, Google Inc., Apple Inc., and
Microsoft Corp.261 This push resulted in donations to Republican war chests totaling
$248,000 just from northern California. 262
Stephen Fincher introduced H.R. 3606—the first bill to contain Title I’s On-Ramp
provisions—on December 8, 2011.263 President Obama signaled his support of prostartup legislation in his January 24, 2012, State of the Union address:
After all, innovation is what America has always been about. Most

253. Mattingly & Schmidt, supra note 244.
254. Steve Case, Chairman, THE CASE FOUND., http://casefoundation.org/profile/steve
-case/ [https://perma.cc/AM7G-YJ6L].
255. See Michelle Quinn, You’ve Got JOBS: Case’s New Mission, POLITICO (Mar. 26,
2012, 11:35 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0312/74501.html [https://perma.cc
/DX2R-2URW] (“Case, an independent with friends in both parties, worked with House
Majority Leader Eric Cantor when he introduced the bills last month.”).
256. Mattingly & Schmidt, supra note 244.
257. Id. (“Case met with Cantor the next day. He said, ‘Why don’t you just take what we’re
doing, since it already has the imprimatur of the White House behind it, and take it up?’”).
258. See Robert Costa, The Battle for Silicon Valley, NAT’L REV. (Sept. 26, 2011,
04:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/278304/battle-silicon-valley-robert-costa
[https://perma.cc/H736-HUBH] (discussing Republican congressional outreach to technology
firms).
259. Mattingly & Schmidt, supra note 244.
260. See Costa, supra note 258 (noting that the three refer to themselves as the “young guns”).
261. Mattingly & Schmidt, supra note 244.
262. Id.
263. Press Release, Representative Stephen Fincher, Reps. Fincher and Carney Introduce
Bipartisan Legislation To Help Small Companies Grow (Dec. 8, 2011), http://fincher
.house.gov/press-release/reps-fincher-and-carney-introduce-bipartisan-legislation-help-small
-companies-grow [https://perma.cc/S62B-L6N8].
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new jobs are created in startups and small businesses. So let’s pass an
agenda that helps them succeed. Tear down regulations that prevent
aspiring entrepreneurs from getting the financing to grow. Expand tax
relief to small businesses that are raising wages and creating good jobs.
Both parties agree on these ideas. So put them in a bill, and get it on my
desk this year.264
By March 8, 2012, the proposed JOBS Act had swelled to encompass industryadvantaging provisions from five other bills. 265
Resistance to the JOBS Act came late. On March 16, 2012, SEC Commissioner
Luis Aguilar urged that investor protection would suffer. 266 Mary Schapiro, the SEC
chairman, sent a six-page letter criticizing the bill to Congress on March 13, 2012.267
Senators Jack Reed (D-RI) and Carl Levin (D-MI) attempted to introduce investorprotective modifications in the Senate 268 on March 20, 2012, only to meet with stiff
Silicon Valley resistance. Stymied on that front, Senator Jack Reed pushed to change
the method for counting holders from record to beneficial holders—a move that ultimately failed269 but succeeded in alarming Wall Street banks, who joined ranks in
opposing the Reed amendment.270 Joining the cause was a high-tech effort led by
AngelList founder Naval Ravikant, who in thirty-six hours created a Twitter petition
with 5000 signatures that could be sorted “by location and how influential, where
they were, and what they’d invested in, and what they look like, and who their senator
was”—and who was a major campaign donor.271
Ultimately the Senate passed the bill by a vote of 73–26 (including 26 “nay” votes

264. Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, 2012 DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 5 (Jan. 24, 2012).
265. See H.R. 3606, 112th Cong. (as passed by House of Representatives, Mar. 8, 2012);
see also H.R. 3606 (112th): Jumpstart Our Business Startups, GOVTRACK, https://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr3606/text/eh#compare=rh [https://perma.cc/8ZQQ-CUBD]
(comparing the version that engrossed in the House on March 8, 2012 with the version reported
by House committee on March 1, 2012 and showing six additional titles).
266. Public Statement, Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar, Investor Protection is Needed for
True Capital Formation: Views on the JOBS Act (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.sec
.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/PublicStmt/1365171490120#.VO9u9rDF8md/ [https://perma.cc
/N8UG-6ZSZ].
267. Mattingly & Schmidt, supra note 244; see also Zach Carter & Ryan Grim, Obama
JOBS Act Leaves Labor Fuming in Democratic Feud, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 5, 2012,
9:52 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/05/obama-jobs-act-labor_n_1404401.html
[https://perma.cc/85X3-EHPT].
268. Carter & Grim, supra note 267.
269. See 158 CONG. REC. S1884, S1919 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2012) (reporting the failure of
a voice vote and motion to resume consideration on the following day).
270. See Mattingly & Schmidt, supra note 244 (“Lobbyists and lawyers from the banks
flooded Senate offices with calls and analysis papers . . . .”).
271. PandoDaily, Naval Ravikant: How I Changed the Jobs Act, YOUTUBE (Nov. 15,
2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ugDyaVLPj3w [https://perma.cc/NY6H-EBFG]
(at timestamp 7:45/8:58).
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from Democrats) on March 22, 2012,272 and the House approved it 380–41,273 with
145 Democrats voting in its favor. 274 The one significant victory reform-minded
Democrats gained was an increase of SEC oversight of crowdfunding—Title III.275
In the end, the JOBS Act’s passage was claimed a resounding success—a rare instance of bipartisan legislation in the midst of a gridlocked Washington.276
IV. DICTATION, DELEGATION, AND THE DATA
Having surveyed the key pieces of securities legislation enacted by Congress from
1970 to 2014, we can turn to the extent to which it introduced into each statute
delegations of authority to agency decision making. To that end, I have constructed
a dataset that covers every title of each securities law enacted by Congress during
this time period. These data include nine statutes that include sixty-six total titles.
Although the number of acts is limited, they comprise the entire field of securities
enacted during this forty-four-year period.
A. Methodology
My goal is to systematically categorize instances of delegation in securities law.
Notably, political scientists David Epstein and Sharyn O’Hallaran undertake a similar project by coding 257 statutes in a variety of fields. 277 Epstein and O’Hallaran’s
methodology falls short for securities-law purposes in three regards. First, their coding scheme relies on the Congressional Quarterly Almanac, which lists “the key
provisions of major legislation enacted during each year.” 278 The result of this approach, however, is to omit altogether key pieces of securities legislation—including
the JOBS Act and SBIIA—presumably because they do not qualify as “major
legislation.”
Second, Epstein and O’Halloran borrow from two earlier categorization systems.
The first, Mayhew’s classification of enacted laws, does not contain securities
regulation.279 The other, Poole and Rosenthal’s roll-call vote study, aggregates
banking and finance in one category. 280 Congress, however, delegates not by policy

272. Jim Abrams, JOBS Act: Senate Passes Small Business Investment Bill, HUFFINGTON
POST (Mar. 22, 2012, 2:09 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/22/jobs-act-senate
-small-business-bill_n_1373136.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20160305062913/http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/22/jobs-act-senate-small-business-bill_n_1373136.html] (last
updated May 22, 2012).
273. Jonathan Weisman, Final Approval by House Sends Jobs Bill to President for
Signature, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/28/us/politics/final
-approval-by-house-sends-jobs-bill-to-president-for-signature.html [https://perma.cc/FE2J-U8T9].
274. John Stanton, Roll Call—House Sends JOBS Act to Barack Obama, VOTE SMART
(Mar. 27, 2012), http://votesmart.org/public-statement/679404/roll-call-house-sends-jobs-act
-to-barack-obama&speechType=8#.WB6eRNUrLct [https://perma.cc/5GAZ-V3BR].
275. See Abrams, supra note 272.
276. Weisman, supra note 273.
277. EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 2, at 89.
278. Id. at 90.
279. Id. at 199.
280. Id. at 202.
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area but by act, and the dictation/delegation hypothesis suggests that its delegation
waxes and wanes over time.
Finally, Congress can delegate in different ways. Sometimes it affirmatively
orders an agency to engage in rule making—what I term a mandatory delegation.
Sometimes Congress permits but does not order agency rule making. Sometimes it
preserves a space for agency discretion outside of rule making. Epstein and
O’Halloran’s coding elides the distinction between mandatory and permissive rule
making and skips over instances in which an agency may exercise discretion even
while not engaging in rule making.281
In sum, while Epstein and O’Halloran’s study offers valuable insights, it does not
fit my purpose of testing the dictation/delegation hypothesis in the securities field.
As a result, I put to use, but expand upon, the coding scheme of Curtis W. Copeland’s
report on rule-making requirements and authorities in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act.282 Like Copeland, I categorize statutes as calling for mandatory rule making if they state that an agency—usually the SEC—
“shall” promulgate rules, or when the statute’s wording otherwise suggests that the
agency must regulate.283 Often, but not always, Congress imposes deadlines—for
example, within 180 days, 90 days, or 270 days after the bill’s effective date—when
it mandates rule making.284
Next in the delegation spectrum is the category of permissive rule making, where
Congress identifies areas in which the agency may create rules but is not ordered to
do so. According to these statutes, the agency “may, by rule” or “may, by regulation”
promulgate the substantive rule.285 In these areas Congress does not expressly direct
delegation, but permits it.

281. Examples of delegation they cite include the following:
(1) discretionary rulemaking authority; (2) the authorization of a program that
allows the agency some discretionary authority; (3) the creation of a board or
commission with authority to regulate some aspect of economic activity;
(4) granting an agency authority to modify or change decision-making criteria;
(5) allowing an agency to allocate moneys or benefits where the determine the
sum and/or possible recipients of those benefits; (6) allowing the agency to waive
or exempt constituents from certain rules or procedures; and (7) extensions of
decision-making authority that would otherwise expire.
Id. at 91–92.
282. CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41380, THE DODD-FRANK WALL
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: REGULATIONS TO BE ISSUED BY
THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 4 (2010), http://www.llsdc.org/assets
/DoddFrankdocs/crs-r41380.pdf [https://perma.cc/L29Q-EFJU].
283. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 922(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1842 (2010) (“The term ‘whistleblower’ means any individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting jointly who provide, information relating to
a violation of the securities laws to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.” (emphasis added)).
284. See, e.g., § 924(a), 124 Stat. at 1850 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §78u-7 (2012)) (“The
Commission shall issue final regulations implementing the provisions . . . not later than 270
days after the date of enactment of this Act.”).
285. Copeland offers as other examples “may determine by rule,” “may prescribe rules,”
“may be defined by the [agency], by regulation,” and “shall prescribe such rules and issue

2017] DICTATION AND DELEGATION IN SECURITIES REGULATION

475

I do not attempt to code for dictations that Congress makes in its statutes, in large
part because of the inherent judgment calls that such coding would necessitate. For
example, consider the possible number of dictations when Congress states that
SLUSA covers class actions that involve
(i) the purchase or sale of securities by the issuer or an affiliate of the
issuer exclusively from or to holders of equity securities of the issuer; or
(ii) any recommendation, position, or other communication with respect
to the sale of securities of the issuer that—(I) is made by or on behalf of
the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer to holders of equity securities of the
issuer; and (II) concerns decisions of those equity holders with respect to
voting their securities, acting in response to a tender or exchange offer,
or exercising dissenters’ or appraisal rights. 286
This subsection can be seen as containing one, two, three, five, or more dictations,
depending on the level of generality one chooses to employ. In any event, the critical
questions considered here involve how often and when Congress chooses to delegate
its authority. And identifying the number of instances of delegation in each relevant
statute is a relatively objective task. Consequently, my data set itemizes delegations
of congressional authority without attempting to enumerate dictations.
Certain delegations—what I term “ministerial,” “catchall,” and “timing” delegations—are excluded from my coding of congressional acts. Ministerial delegations
occur when Congress simply orders the SEC to make rules to carry out a clear legislative mandate. One example is provided by JOBS Act section 303 in which Congress
excluded crowdfunding investors from the total number of shareholders of record for
the purposes of section 12(g) of the Exchange Act’s threshold and then ordered the
SEC to “issue a rule to carry out” the amendment within 270 days. 287 Catchall
delegations occur when Congress sets a deadline for implementing whatever rules
the legislation requires without specifying any particular content. For example, after
delegating a variety of questions to the SEC, section 302 of the JOBS Act tasks the
agency with “issu[ing] such rules as the Commission determines may be necessary
or appropriate for the protection of investors to carry out sections 4(6) and section
4A of the Securities Act of 1933, as added by this title.” 288 Timing delegations merely
set forth a deadline for when rule making must occur.289
As well as coding delegations, I also code general grants of discretion to the SEC.

such guidance as may be necessary” that were treated as discretionary rule-making provisions.
Copeland, supra note 282, at 29–36.
286. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 101(a),
112 Stat. 3227, 3228.
287. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106 § 303, 126 Stat.
306, 321 (2012).
288. § 302(c), 126 Stat. at 320; see also § 924(a), 124 Stat. at 1850 (“The Commission
shall issue final regulations implementing the provisions of section 21F of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as added by this subtitle, not later than 270 days after the date of enactment of this Act.”).
289. See, e.g., § 937, 124 Stat. 1885 (“Unless otherwise specifically provided in this subtitle, the Commission shall issue final regulations, as required by this subtitle and the amendments made by this subtitle, not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act.”).

476

I N DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 92:435

For example, Title I of the JOBS Act provides that any new auditing rules adopted
by PCAOB will not apply to emerging growth companies “unless the Commission
determines that the application of such additional requirements is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest, after considering the protection of investors and
whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.” 290
Here Congress does not use formal “shall, by rule,” or “may, by rule,” language, but
as a functional matter it vests the agency with broad power. A more complicated
coding problem is presented by Dodd-Frank section 912. That provision states that
“[f]or the purpose of evaluating any rule or program . . . the Commission may (1)
gather information from and communicate with investors or other members of the
public; (2) engage in such temporary investor testing programs as the Commission
determines are in the public interest or would protect investors; and (3) consult with
academics and consultants, as necessary to carry out this subsection.” 291 While such
a provision is not a mandatory or permissive rule making, it gives the agency
“testing” authority and a broad discretion as to its use. As a practical matter, the
agency thus can impose significant duties on regulated businesses, and I have
therefore coded this measure as involving congressional delegation.
My dataset also excludes provisions with no impact on the SEC’s rule making.
For example, titles granting financing to the SEC itself occur several times. 292 Other
titles express a policy preference but contain no actual law. For example, SarbanesOxley Title X consists of a single sentence: “It is the sense of the Senate that the
Federal income tax return of a corporation should be signed by the chief executive
officer of such corporation.”293 I attach no delegatory significance to this title, and
exclude it from the sample.
The dictation/delegation hypothesis predicts that postcrisis legislative acts
—namely, SIPA, the Amendments of 1975, Sarbanes-Oxley, and Dodd-Frank—will
contain more delegation than their noncrisis legislative counterparts. In general, the
data bear out the hypothesis, as shown by Figure 1, a summary of averages of postcrisis and noncrisis delegations. First, taking mandatory and permissive delegations,
the average number for postcrisis delegations per act (48.25) is more than twice the
number of noncrisis delegations (17.20). Adding in instances where Congress cedes
areas of discretion to the agency magnifies this relationship: the average number of
postcrisis delegations and instances of discretion, at 96, is more than four times that
in noncrisis times, at 22. Thus it does seem that, on average, when Congress acts in
the realm of securities law in the context of crisis, it tends to delegate more often to
the SEC. However, the question whether crisis alone explains the extent of delegation
requires further analysis because of the role that politics plays in legislation.

290. See, e.g., § 104, 126 Stat. at 310.
291. See § 912, 124 Stat. at 1824.
292. See, e.g., Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353,
§ 201, 112 Stat. 3227, 3233–34; National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-290, §§ 403–05, 110 Stat. 3416, 3441–44; Small Business Investment Incentive
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 401, 94 Stat. 2275, 2291; Securities Acts Amendments of
1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, §§ 22, 24, 89 Stat. 97, 162.
293. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §1001, 165 Stat. 745, 807.
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Figure 1. Delegation to Agency
When the same party controls the elected branches of government (Executive,
House, and Senate), policy making becomes easier to the extent that the separate
branches share similar goals and have incentives to work together to enact a shared
agenda. Within this context, we might expect to see more delegations as Congress
trusts the Executive to implement its agenda faithfully. In contrast, when opposite
parties control Congress and the Executive, we might expect fewer delegations as
Congress attempts to curb presidential authority over the agencies. In addition, when
opposite parties control the House and Senate, we might actually observe more
delegations as a means of striking a compromise between the two chambers. That is,
because they might not agree on a specific set of rules, the two chambers might
compromise by delegating greater authority to the regulatory agencies instead.
B. The Political Variable
A political explanation of congressional delegation in securities law focuses on
the extent to which government is divided, or the extent to which a given party is in
control of the three branches of government. To evaluate whether political factors
overwhelm the effects of securities crises, I conducted a statistical analysis that
weighs the two effects against one another. More specifically, I estimate a simple
“count” model to evaluate the extent to which, first, securities crises and, second,
partisan political alignments among the federal branches affect how Congress makes
delegations to the SEC.294
For each statistical model, I estimate the predicted number of delegations for each
title as a function of both “crisis” factors and “political” factors. More specifically, I

294. A “count” model is a maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) derived from the Poisson
distribution, which is distributed on a positive, discrete interval. The purpose of the estimator
is to determine whether certain input variables have a statistically significant effect upon the
number of observed delegations, holding other relevant factors constant.
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code whether each act was passed in response to a securities “crisis” (“1” if yes, “0”
if no). If the dictation/delegation theory is correct, we would expect to see more
congressional delegations amidst securities crises and fewer such delegations in the
absence of such crises. Nevertheless, policy making does not occur in a vacuum.
Hence, we might suspect that political factors also affect Congress’s choice to delegate to the agencies.
To control for these political factors, I include two dichotomous explanatory
variables that might affect the number of delegations Congress makes to executive
agencies in any given title. I first control for whether the legislative and executive
branches are controlled by the same party in the year in which the act was passed
(“1” if yes, “0” otherwise). Second, I control for whether the U.S. House and Senate
are controlled by the same party in the year in which an act was passed (“1” if yes,
“0” otherwise).295 Table 1, below, summarizes the data used for the analyses.
Table 1. Summary of variables used in statistical regression
Description

Mean
(Std. Dev.)

Total Delegations

Dependent Variable: The total number of
delegations in a given title of a given act

7.48
(13.03)

Permissive/Mandatory
Delegations

Dependent Variable: The total number of
permissive/mandatory delegations in a given
title of a given act

4.21
(6.92)

“Crisis” Legislation

Dichotomous (“1” if the act was passed
amidst a securities crisis, “0” otherwise.)

0.67
(0.48)

Divided President/Congress

Dichotomous (“1” if the act was passed
when Congress and the Presidency were
controlled by the same party, “0” otherwise)

0.73
(0.45)

Divided Senate/House

Dichotomous (“1” if the act was passed
when the House and the Senate were controlled by the same party, “0” otherwise)

0.09
(0.29)

Variable

The key question for the purposes of this Article is whether crisis influences
congressional delegation even when controlling for partisan control of the federal
government. Multivariate statistical analysis reveals that the presence of securities
crises plays a statistically significant and substantively meaningful role in the number
of delegations Congress makes to executive agencies in a given title of a given act,
independent of political divisions in government.
Figure 2, set forth below, uses the results from the multivariate regression

295. We are not restricted to these methodological choices alone. First, one might suppose
that the relative distance among the political institutions might be a superior predictor of
delegatory behavior than the binary measures specified above. I estimated the below models
again using absolute ideological distances between the federal branches of government instead
of the dichotomous indicators specified within the text. I note that the main results of the
analysis hold with respect to the predicted effect “crisis” legislating has on the number of
delegations Congress makes to executive agencies. I do observe differences, however, in the
predicted effect politics plays in the decisional process among the federal branches.
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analysis, to show this phenomenon graphically. Each pane of the figure shows
Congress’s predicted number of delegations to an agency, subdivided over whether
a “crisis” exists (yes or no). The left-hand pane shows the predicted number of all
types of delegations, and the right-hand pane shows the predicted number of “permissive” and “mandatory” types of delegations. The y-axis of each pane shows the predicted number of delegations a title will include, holding political control of the
House, Senate, and presidency constant. The x-axis shows whether the act was
passed in the midst of a securities crisis. The dark lines in the plot and the shaded
regions represent the statistical models’ best guess as to the effect the crisis variable
has on the number of delegations (with 95% certainty). 296 The dots represent
statistical outliers beyond the 95% certainty threshold and should not be considered
reliable estimates of the effect a crisis plays on Congress’s delegations.
Total
TotalDelegations
Delegations

Mandatory/Permissive
Delegations
Mandatory/Permissive Delegations
10

Number of Delegations per Title
Predicted
Predicted Number of Delegations per Title

Title
perTitle
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Figure 2. The two graphs depict the predicted number of delegations Congress makes to its
agencies. The left-hand pane shows predictions among all types of delegations. The right-hand
pane shows the predicted number of “permissive” or “mandatory” delegations. The y-axes in
each frame shows the statistical model’s predicted number of delegations, and the x-axes subset these predictions according to whether a given act was passed amidst a securities crisis.

Analyzing the content of the graphs in the figure, we see a striking result
—namely, that after accounting for political party control, postcrisis Congress is
nearly twice as likely to delegate as when there is no crisis. In the fully specified
model, the statistical estimator predicts that any given title of a congressional act
should contain approximately 4.5 delegations when no securities crisis exists. The

296. Indeed, uncertainty is the cornerstone to every statistical analysis. If the results did
not vary by observations, we would not have recourse to statistical analysis because we would
be certain of all outcomes.
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actual data suggest, however, that Congress will make closer to 8.5 delegations. That
is, when Congress has legislated within the context of a securities crisis, the number
of total delegations is nearly double what one would see in the absence of crisis. The
right-hand pane shows a similar (even if not quite as strong) effect among all
mandatory and permissive types of delegations. In the midst of a crisis, the model
predicts that Congress should make approximately four mandatory or permissive
delegations, compared to only three when there exists no similar crisis. That is, by
moving into a postcrisis period, the statistical estimator predicts the total number of
permissive or mandatory delegations to increase by approximately twenty-five
percent. These findings (across both models) are statistically significant. And they
indicate that the presence of a crisis has important substantive implications as to how
the federal government regulates securities, who will determine the scope of those
regulations, and how often delegated authority will be exercised. No less important,
the political control variables I included in each of the multivariate analyses prove to
be of little significance.297
Table 2 presents the full results from the multivariate statistical analyses. I
considered both the total number of delegations made in each title of every act, and
I also considered the number of “permissive” or “mandatory” delegations in each
title of every act. As such, the dependent variable in the regression models was the
number of delegations in the titles of each act. I included three independent (or
explanatory) variables in each of these models. First, I controlled for whether the act
in question was passed in the wake of a securities crisis. Next, I controlled for political factors relating to partisan control of the elected branches of the federal government. More specifically, I controlled for whether Congress and the Executive were
each controlled by one political party, and I also controlled for whether the House
and the Senate were controlled by the same party. The results from each count model
are included below in Table 2.
The results included in the table represent coefficient estimates from the
maximum likelihood estimators. Positive values mean that the presence of the variable has a positive effect on the number of congressional delegations, and negative
values mean the opposite. The crucial point for present purposes is revealed by the
“Crisis” Legislation/Total Delegations box. It is here that we encounter the key
finding of this study—namely, that the existence of a crisis produces a statistically

297. Indeed, neither political control variable achieved statistical significance. That is to
say, we cannot conclude based upon this evidence that the political control of the presidency
and/or the Congress has a noticeable effect on how Congress delegates authority to executive
agencies, even when holding securities crises constant. Only in the model that analyzed
mandatory or permissive delegations do we observe any political effect, but even this is slight.
For example, the predicted effect of a political division between the president and Congress is
negative (as hypothesized), but this effect is slight and arguably fails to achieve statistical
significance. I do note, however, that the control for political divisions between the two chambers of Congress achieves statistical significance in the model analyzing mandatory or
permissive delegations. I find that, holding all other political and crisis control variables equal,
moving from a united Congress to a partisan divided one (i.e., one party controls the House,
another controls the Senate) results in an increase in the number of predicted delegations (by
about one), as above hypothesized. The figure above demonstrates this phenomenon
graphically.
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significant increase in the delegation of congressional authority when all forms of
delegation are taken into account.
Table 2. Results from Multivariate Statistical Analysis. Notes: N=66. Values in the top portion
of each cell represent MLE coefficient estimates, and values in parentheses indicate standard
errors. Statistical significance values as follows: p < .001 (***), p < .050 (**), p < .100 (*).
Variable

Total Delegations

Permissive/Mandatory

“Crisis” Legislation

0.65***
(0.13)

0.35**
(0.16)

Divided President/Congress

-0.13
(0.11)

-0.24*
(0.14)

Divided Senate/House

0.25
(0.22)

0.57**
(0.24)

Intercept

1.61***
(0.12)

1.31***
(0.15)

Log-Likelihood

-516.68

-322.61

C. Crisis and Delegation
One obvious explanation for frequent delegation in postcrisis legislation is that in
periods of crisis, Congress simply does not have the time to slow down and dictate
precise policy prescriptions. Instead, it contents itself with big-picture matters and
delegates the details to the agency. Indeed, this may well be a fair reading of the
critique of bubble laws offered by Professors Romano, Ribstein, and Bainbridge:
when Congress legislates under pressure it gets substantive policy wrong and perforce delegates too much to the SEC. In noncrisis situations, cooler heads prevail,
and Congress dictates because it has the time to get policy questions right.
The data offer some support for this explanation. But that support is limited
because only one act occurred in the midst of a crisis: SIPA (SOX occurred in the
immediate wake of crisis). In addition, the story of SIPA is hard to square with the
emergency-breeds-delegation thesis. It contained relatively little delegation
—indeed, only nine instances of mandatory and permissive delegation, the third
lowest in the entire period. In contrast, the Amendments of 1975 contained at least
188 delegations, the highest number of delegations of any act. These were part of the
bargain struck after the relevant crisis had passed, and Congress sought to address
long-term concerns raised by the crisis. Apart from SIPA, Sarbanes-Oxley was the
only other piece of legislation passed in a crisis-like environment—that is, amidst
the fallout of the failure of Enron, the WorldCom bankruptcy lent fresh urgency to
Congress’s efforts. Here there was a significant amount of delegation. Even so, in
Dodd-Frank, which was enacted after the economy had passed through the throes of
the financial crisis, even more delegations were made.
On balance then, Congress passed two of its four crisis-inspired acts after the
crisis had occurred. Yet it engaged in extensive delegation in each of those two cases.
As to the other two enactments, the results were mixed: Sarbanes-Oxley, passed in
response to the catalyst of WorldCom’s failure, delegated substantial authority to the
governing agency, but SIPA did not. In sum, this pattern provides no significant support for the thesis that ongoing emergencies foster delegation; crisis-based
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motivation, rather than merely midst-of-crisis, appears to be the key driver of
congressional delegation.
V. DISTINCTIVE STATUTES
A closer look at the data reveals some deviations from the overall pattern, as
indicated by Figures 3 and 4 below. Figure 3 graphs Congress’s mandatory and
permissive delegations, act by act. Figure 4 shows Congress’s mandatory and
permissive delegations, as wells as instances where Congress granted the SEC
discretionary authority. Most notably, the Amendments of 1975, Dodd-Frank, and
Sarbanes-Oxley—all crisis-related measures—conform to the dictation/delegation
thesis by containing a large number of delegations. But SIPA does not. As to the
noncrisis legislation, SBIIA, PSLRA, and SLUSA conform, but NSMIA and the
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Figure 3. Mandatory and Permissive Delegation
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Figure 4. Mandatory, Permissive, and Instances of Agency Discretion

JOBS Act do not. The balance of this Part will attempt to account for these departures
from the prevailing pattern.
A. SIPA & NSMIA
Why did SIPA—which was enacted in the midst of the Paperwork Crisis
—embody very few delegations? The explanation is a simple one. At the time, Wall
Street faced a crisis in public confidence as banks were unable to process the high
volumes of paper that accompanied traditional stock transfers. Congress thus needed
to act swiftly for a focused purpose—to reassure clients that, should their particular
broker-dealer fail, they would not lose their money. And SIPA addressed this targeted problem in a targeted way, by creating the SIPC to serve as a federal backstop.
As part of the larger legislative bargaining, however, Congress required a future
study of root causes of the problem to find better means to address them after the
immediate crisis had been remedied. Thus SIPA was a stopgap solution that kicked
much of the work down the road. The result was Congress’s follow-up legislation of
1975, which contains more instances of delegation than any of the other securities
laws enacted during the sample period.
NSMIA also poses a special case, primarily because it presented the rare situation
where an administrative agency came forward with the language of the Act. At the
same time, the mutual fund industry and the SEC were allied against the states in
seeking federal preemption of a then-operative patchwork of local securities regulation. Thus NSMIA sprang out of an exceptional situation in which delegation to an
agency represented the lesser of two evils for a sizable business constituency. Put
another way, NSMIA was the product of an unusual alliance between regulatory
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officials and regulated entities, which produced gains for both. And the gains to the
agency came in the form of enhanced discretionary regulatory power.
B. JOBS Act: Two Laws in One
Understanding the JOBS Act’s delegation story begins with recognizing a
curiosity of the legislative process and result: the JOBS Act is the product of two
separate and distinct forces. Half of the JOBS Act’s titles conform to the
dictation/delegation pattern of noncrisis congressional dictation. These are the half
of the JOBS Act backed by significant moneyed interests: banks and Silicon Valley.
The other half of the Act contains far more delegation. This section will explore the
reasons for such marked divergence in delegation in a single Act.
1. Dictation in the JOBS Act
a. Title I
Title I, the catalyst for the JOBS Act’s passage, is perhaps the most prescriptive
of its provisions. Moreover, many of Title I’s substantive provisions are drawn nearly
verbatim from the suggestions of Kate Mitchell’s IPO Task Force report. The report
recommended creating a new category of issuer, the emerging growth company
(EGC), and detailed its defining characteristics (total annual gross revenue of less
than $1 billion) and the manner for exiting EGC status.298 It identified particular
disclosure rules to which EGCs should not be subject for five years. 299 It specified
that EGCs should be able to disclose two years of audited financials at IPO, instead
of the customary three years. 300
Representative Stephen Fincher introduced the bill containing the Title I
provisions on December 8, 2011,301 and its provisions hewed closely to the IPO Task
Force’s recommendations. The Act defines emerging growth company using a specific metric: an issuer with total annual gross revenues of less than $1,000,000,000.302
Title I similarly detailed the paths, including two suggested by the IPO Task Force
report, by which an emerging growth company would shed its EGC status. 303

298. IPO TASK FORCE, supra note 252, at 20.
299. Id. at 21–23.
300. Id. at 22.
301. H.R. 3606, 112th Cong. (as introduced in House of Representatives, Dec. 8, 2011).
302. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106 § 101(a), 126 Stat.
306, 307 (2012).
303. And those four paths were detailed:
(A) the last day of the fiscal year of the issuer during which it had total annual
gross revenues of $1,000,000,000 (as such amount is indexed for inflation every
5 years by the Commission to reflect the change in the Consumer Price Index for
All Urban Consumers published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, setting the
threshold to the nearest 1,000,000) or more; (B) the last day of the fiscal year of
the issuer following the fifth anniversary of the date of the first sale of common
equity securities of the issuer pursuant to an effective registration statement under
this title; (C) the date on which such issuer has, during the previous 3-year period,
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Title I also itemizes specific ways to relax the regulatory requirements for EGCs
during the going-public process in highly specific ways that mirror the IPO Task
Force’s recommendations. First, EGCs may present two years of audited financial
statements, rather than the three required of normal corporations.304 Second, following the IPO Task Force’s suggestion,305 the title expands the permissible range of
communications between the issuer and both analysts and potential investors. 306
Third, Title I tracks the IPO Task Force’s recommendations specifying that these
accommodations are “opt-in” rights and that emerging growth companies can forgo
a particular exemption and instead comply with the normal issuer requirements. 307
Finally, and again taking a cue from the IPO Task Force report, it permits emerging
growth companies to file confidential draft registration statements with the SEC prior
to public filing.308 This accommodation allows both the issuer and underwriter a
chance to gauge the SEC’s concerns with an offering prior to making the registration
statement public.309
And that is not all. Title I details the exact provisions of the 1934 Act from which
EGCs are exempt, provisions suggested by the IPO Task Force report: executive
compensation, proxies, auditor rotation, and the much-reviled section 404 internal
controls audit.310 One could easily imagine that Congress would task the SEC with
examining its rules and using its expertise to determine which of its rules warranted
suspension for EGCs, engaging in an analysis of their relative utility given the burdens they place on issuers and the benefits they provide to investors. Yet Title I, far
from deferring to agency expertise, dictated the law on its own—after itself taking
dictation from the IPO Task Force report.
Title I makes only one, begrudging, allowance for the exercise of agency
discretion. It states that after an EGC goes public, subsequent accounting rules that
the Financial Accounting and Standards Board adopts “[will] not apply [to the EGC]
unless the Commission determines that the application of such additional requirements is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, after considering the protection of investors and whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and
capital formation.”311 The provenance of this lone concession to agency discretion
can also be traced to the IPO Task Force report.312

issued more than $1,000,000,000 in non-convertible debt; or (D) the date on
which such issuer is deemed to be a ‘large accelerated filer’, as defined in section
240.12b–2 of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor thereto.
Id.
304. Id. § 102(b)(1).
305. IPO TASK FORCE, supra note 252, at 28.
306. JOBS Act § 105.
307. Id. § 107; IPO TASK FORCE, supra note 252, at 22.
308. Id. § 106; IPO TASK FORCE, supra note 252, at 29.
309. There is reason to believe that this feature is the most popular and useful of the JOBS
Act Title I accommodations. See Usha Rodrigues, The Effect of the JOBS Act on Underwriting
Spreads, 102 KY. L.J. 925, 933 (2013–2014).
310. JOBS Act §§ 102–104.
311. Id. § 104.
312. See IPO TASK FORCE, supra note 252, at 24 (recommending that the PCAOB should
consider “cost of implementation for [EGCs]” among other things).

486

I N DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 92:435

The bottom line is that Title I, using the IPO Task Force report as a template,
created a new, easier path to public status for small companies—the very companies
that pose the highest risk of defrauding investors. The Act exempts these companies
from specific SEC regulations and articulates a less onerous path to the public markets. And the rules for securing such an exemption are detailed in the act itself, free
from tinkering by agency officials—just what Silicon Valley wanted.
b. Title V
Title V represents another offensive deregulatory push, on a different front and
by a different industry. The legislative history of Title V illustrates how attractive
dictating, as opposed to delegating, legislation can be for regulated firms. Title V
was enacted against the backdrop of section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act,
which had required corporations with over 500 shareholders of record to register with
the SEC—thus in effect coercing them to go public. 313 Both debate on Capitol Hill
and behind-the-scenes campaign contribution data reveal how worrisome this
requirement was to some firms.
Firms approaching the 500-shareholder number, including Pennsylvania-based
convenience store Wawa, Inc., were particularly concerned about section 12(g).314
But section 12(g) posed an even greater problem for SecondMarket, Inc., a relatively
new company that provided a secondary market for trading the shares of private
companies.315 The more private companies allowed their shares to be traded on
SecondMarket, the more their shareholder rolls began to bump up against section
12(g)’s threshold.316 Thus, the law threatened to drive pre-IPO companies away from
SecondMarket’s exchange completely.
Wawa and SecondMarket responded in disparate and revealing ways to the threat
that section 12(g) posed to their businesses. SecondMarket’s CEO testified before
Congress to persuade it of the seriousness of the problem (without mentioning the
specific interest his firm had in raising the threshold).317 He also made well-timed
campaign contributions. Representative Jim Himes (D-CT) introduced an act on May
24, 2011, proposing to raise the registration threshold for banks and bank holding
companies (as Title VI ultimately would do) and to require the SEC to study the

313. Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 3(c), 78 Stat. 565, 566–
67 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1) (2006)).
314. See ANNE KIM, PROGRESSIVE POLICY INST., 501 SHAREHOLDERS: REDEFINING
“PUBLIC” COMPANIES TO HELP EMERGING FIRMS 6 (2011), http://progressivepolicy.org/wp
-content/uploads/2011/12/12.2011-Kim_501-Shareholders_Redefining-Public-Companies-to
-Help-Emerging-Firms.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8UD-82KP] (describing Wawa’s struggles
with the 500-shareholder cap); see also, Usha R. Rodrigues, The Once and Future Irrelevancy
of Section 12(g), 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1529, 1556 (2015).
315. Rodrigues, supra note 314, at 1538.
316. Id. at 1539.
317. See Legislative Proposals To Facilitate Small Business Capital Formation and Job
Creation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the
H. Comm. on Fin. Sers., 112th Cong. 35, (2001) [hereinafter Legislative Proposals Hearing]
(statement of Barry Silbert, Founder & Chief Executive Officer, SecondMarket, Inc.).
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thresholds applicable to all companies.318 Within two weeks two SecondMarket
employees—its CEO and its head of public affairs—each donated $1000 to
Representative Himes,319 even though neither individual had ever before made an
out-of-state political donation to any candidate. 320
Senator David Schweikert (R-AZ) introduced legislation on June 14, 2011,
proposing not agency action (as had H.R. 1965), but an outright legislative fix: raising the threshold to 1000 and excluding employees and accredited investors from the
count entirely.321 Accredited, or wealthy, investors322 were the only individuals who
could trade on SecondMarket’s exchange. 323 Therefore, by definition, no
SecondMarket transferees would count for the purposes of the Schweikert’s new bill.
Notably, SecondMarket’s CEO had donated another $1000 to Representative
Schweikert only one day before he introduced the bill. 324
Recall that the other main corporate advocate for what would become Title V was
Pennsylvania-based Wawa.325 Wawa’s employees were active in making campaign
contributions.326 But of particular note is an exchange that took place at a hearing
before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, involving
both Wawa’s Chief Financial and Administrative Officer Christopher Gheysens and
Meredith Cross, Director of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance. This exchange brought into clear focus the merits of dictation versus delegation from the
perspective of corporate entities.327
Senator Pat Toomey (R-PA), acting as an advocate for his local corporate
constituent, asked Gheysens whether it made “any difference to you guys” whether
section 12(g)’s threshold was raised by Congress or the SEC. 328 Gheysens replied:

318. See infra Part V.B.1.c.
319. Individual Contributions Arranged by Type, Giver, then Recipient, FED. ELECTION
COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/advindsea.shtml (search “Employer” field
for “SecondMarket”) (listing contributions by Mark Murphy on June 6, 2011 and Barry Silbert
on June 7, 2011, each in the amount of $1000 to Rep. Himes).
320. Id.
321. Private Company Flexibility and Growth Act, H.R. 2167, 112th Cong. §§ 2–3 (2011).
322. Individuals with a net annual income of over $200,000 or a total net worth of over
one million dollars may invest in securities that are not registered, provided that those securities meet the general disclosure requirements of Rule 502. Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)–(6)
(2016).
323. Rodrigues, supra note 314, at 1539.
324. Individual Contributions Arranged by Type, Giver, then Recipient, supra note 319 (listing a contribution by Barry Silbert on June 13, 2011 in the amount of $1000 to Rep.
Schweikert).
325. Rodrigues, supra note 314, at 1556.
326. See Usha R. Rodrigues, The Price of Corruption, 31 J.L. & POL. 45, 62 (2015)
(“Wawa employees were not as politically engaged as SecondMarket's employees, but six of
them made a total of $11,000 in donations to the Friends of Pat Toomey political action campaign on June 27, 2012, two months after the passage of the JOBS Act.” (footnote omitted)).
327. See Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors
—Part I: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong.
29–30 (2011) [hereinafter Spurring Job Growth Hearing].
328. Id. at 29.
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“It does not. Either Congress or by rule of the SEC, the process to us, we are indifferent. The importance for us really is the timeline. We are at an inflection point.” 329
Senator Toomey then asked the SEC’s Cross to provide “any sense for a
timeframe . . . by which the agency would reach a decision about raising the
[500-]shareholder limit.”330 Cross answered:
[W]hen the limit was originally put in, it followed a robust study to
understand the costs and the benefits and the economic consequences of
a change in the rule. So we are doing that now. That takes time, I am
afraid. So I expect that we would get the work done on the study during
2012, and then the Commission, if they decide they want to change the
rule, would need to put out a rule proposal. So it is at least . . . more than
a year away.331
Toomey responded, “I just have to say that is disappointing.” 332
Toomey may have been disappointed, but he should not have been surprised.
Wawa faced the necessity of reducing its shareholder count by way of a reverse stock
split that would cost it $40 million. 333 Given the exigencies of Wawa’s timeline and
the inherent delays of agency rule making, Wawa was in fact not “indifferent” at all.
It needed deregulation posthaste—which meant baking an increase in the shareholder
threshold directly into the legislation. And that is just what Wawa got in Title V of
the JOBS Act.
Title V’s ultimate language represented something of a compromise: it raised the
proposed threshold to 2000, or 500 unaccredited investors. 334 Yet the important point
for our purposes is what did not change: that Congress would dictate the appropriate
trigger number, taking that task away from agency experts even as the SEC was
studying this very issue. Members of Congress offered some anecdotal evidence
about the burdens section 12(g) placed on firms.335 But the empirical data do not
support the argument that a large number of firms were forced to go public by the
former section 12(g) threshold of 500 shareholders. 336 Thus, as with Title I, a

329. Id.
330. Id. at 30.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 34; see also David Ingram & Alexandra Alper, Wawa, Wegmans, Other Private
Companies Ratchet up Lobbying Efforts To Keep Finances Secret, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec.
29, 2011, 7:26 PM) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/29/private-companies-lobbying
_n_1175418.html [https://perma.cc/P9QT-7VTN] (last updated Feb. 28, 2012).
334. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §501, 126 Stat.
306, 325 (2012).
335. See Rodrigues, supra note 314, at 1541 (“One House representative referred to ‘a
company in Newport, Vermont, that has been under a lot of regulatory pressure. They can't go
over that 500 threshold.’ Montana Senator Tester cited a seventy-five year old ‘Montanagrown company’ that ‘has always believed in rewarding its employees so they can have a stake
in the success of the firm, which now operates in 16 States,’ but faced the choice of ‘costly
public registration or potentially eliminating existing employee shareholders.’” (footnote
omitted)).
336. Id.
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cohesive interest group succeeded in having its desired policy result encoded directly
into the JOBS Act.
c. Title VI
Banks were the force behind Title VI, which specifically sought to allow banks to
remain private longer337 and to make it easier for public banks to go private or “go
dark.” Title VI originally sought to raise section 12(g)’s threshold to 2000 shareholders for banks and bank holding companies. 338 In a case of convergent evolution,
Title V ultimately came to the same result with respect to all public firms. Title VI
did relax one additional requirement solely for banks and bank holding companies,
however, and that relates to making it easier for them to “go dark”—that is, for public
companies to delist from a public exchange and return to private ownership.
Prior to the passage of the JOBS Act, once a company went public it could only
go private again if it had fewer than 300 shareholders of record.339 Professor Edward
Rock argued that by making it relatively easy to go public but relatively difficult to
go dark—because of the necessity for having 300 shareholders or fewer—U.S.
securities laws created a “credible commitment” to public investors that once a firm
went public, it would remain public.340 Rock thus urged that the 300-shareholder exit
level was a key feature of U.S. securities law.341 Title VI of the JOBS Act quadrupled
the going-dark threshold to 1200, and thereby weakened that credible commitment—
at least, for banks and bank holding companies.342
While these proposed amendments may seem technical, they were of great
importance to the banking community. Debate in Congress emphasized the burdens
these purportedly out-of-date regulations placed upon small, community banks, by
forcing them to go public once they reach 500 shareholders. As one witness stated:
“Community banks . . . are the life blood of our local economies. . . . These are the
banks we need to see lending to small businesses and homeowners, but they are
hamstrung in their attempt to raise capital by outdated SEC registration requirements.
This one is over half a century old.”343
Representatives stressed the problems that the 500-shareholder threshold posed

337. 157 CONG. REC. 16,462 (2011) (statement of Rep. Himes) (explaining that HR 1965,
eventually Title VI of the JOBS Act, “would allow banks and bank holding companies to
remain private” until it makes sense for them to go public).
338. H.R. 1965, 112th Cong. § 1(a)(1)(A) (as introduced in House of Representatives, May
24, 2011).
339. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(4) (2006); see also Certifications of Termination of Registration
Under Section 12(g), 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-4(a)(1) (2016).
340. Edward Rock, Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap: A Credible Commitment Theory
of Mandatory Disclosure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 675, 684, 688–89 (2002).
341. Id. at 688–89.
342. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), Pub. L. No. 112-106 § 601, 126
Stat. 306, 326 (2012); JOBS Act Implementation Update: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Investigations, Oversight & Regulations of the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 113th Cong. 43–44
(prepared statement of Lona Nallengara, Acting Director, Division of Corporation Finance,
SEC, and John Ramsay, Acting Director, Division of Trading and Markets, SEC).
343. 157 CONG. REC. 16,462 (2011) (statement of Rep. Hoyer).
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for banks: “they are then forced to lower their number of shareholders by buying
back stock which, all too often, means losing local shareholders who keep these
banks connected with their local communities.”344 Allowing community banks more
freedom to take on new investors, Representative Womack argued, removes a barrier
to capital formation.345
Senator Kay Hutchison (R-TX) introduced Senate Bill 556, on March 10, 2011,
and its substantive provisions survived unscathed in the JOBS Act. 346 On May 24,
2011, Representative James Himes (D-CT) introduced an identically worded
companion bill in the House.347 From their inception, both bills dictated to regulators
regarding the main purpose of legislation, providing that for banks and bank holding
companies, the shareholder registration threshold be raised to 2000 persons and
raising the threshold for deregistration from 300 to 1200 persons.
Title VI tracks the language of the original House and Senate bills almost
verbatim. Although the title directs the SEC to “issue final regulations to implement
this title and the amendments made by this title,”348 there was in effect almost nothing
for the SEC to do except alter its previous regulation as Title VI directed. Indeed,
according to my coding scheme, there is not a single instance of delegation in Title
VI. It simply dictates the law.
This dictation is all the more noteworthy because Congress was well aware that
the SEC was in fact at the time studying the very question of shareholder registration
thresholds. The head of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance testified to lawmakers that the agency was in the process of gathering the relevant data. 349 Congress
thus preempted any agency action—and without having before it any empirical data
as to the kind of banks and bank shareholders that would be affected by deregulation.
Title VI illustrates the dictation/delegation thesis in action. How large a company
should become before being forced to go public is a serious question. Data were
available. The SEC was looking into the matter. Congress could easily have delegated the issue to the SEC. But no crisis loomed and regulated banks saw the opportunity to “play offense” in seeking a favorable regulatory change. That change
required forestalling agency action and their efforts to secure that result survived
unscathed from the bill’s introduction to become enshrined in statutory law.

344. Id.
345. Id. at 16,463 (statement of Rep. Womack).
346. S. 556, 112th Cong. (as introduced in Senate, Mar. 10, 2011). Hutchison would introduce Senate Bill 1941, a similar bill omitting language requesting a study of registration
thresholds for non-banks, on December 5, 2011. S. 1941, 112th Cong. (as introduced in Senate,
Dec. 5, 2011).
347. H.R. 1965, 112th Cong. (as introduced in House of Representatives, May 24, 2011).
348. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106 § 602, 127 Stat.
306, 327 (2012).
349. Legislative Proposals Hearing, supra note 317, at 69–73 (2011) (prepared statement
of Meredith Cross, Director, Division of Corporation Finance, Securities & Exchange
Commission); Spurring Job Growth Hearing supra note 327, at 10 (2011) (statement of
Meredith Cross, Director, Division of Corporation Finance, Securities & Exchange
Commission).
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2. Delegation in the JOBS Act
Thus far we have seen how Silicon Valley, the financial industry, Wawa, and
SecondMarket mounted a successful campaign to dictate preferred changes in the
JOBS Act. But other groups were less successful in playing offense: while they secured some regulatory wins, they came at the cost of large measures of delegation.
To understand the importance of the changes wrought by these titles, the reader
should have clearly in mind the pre-JOBS Act rules of investing. Prior to the JOBS
Act, federal law limited the average investor to investing in the shares of publicly
traded companies that have made extensive, and expensive, disclosures with the
SEC.350 Only accredited investors could invest in private firms.351 And private firms
could not “generally advertise” for investors—that is, solicit the general public for
investment funds.352 Instead, they had to use password-protected websites, private
brokers, and other methods designed to protect the general public from learning
about these ventures.353 Title II of the JOBS Act eliminated this ban on general
solicitation; Title III for the first time allowed the general public to invest in stillprivate firms; and Title IV increased the amount private firms could raise from
investors.
a. Title II
Enacting Title II required industry members to persuade Congress to allow for
general solicitation—that is, advertising to the general public. Naval Ravikant, a cofounder of AngelList, was a key backer of Title II, which in the end relaxed the ban
on general solicitation. In Ravikant’s account, his team “approach[ed] the problem
like a startup.”354 Traditionally a bill’s backers submit Word documents with names
demonstrating support for their position. Indeed, unions submitted such a document
with 3600 opposing the measure. 355 But Ravikant organized a 36-hour viral Twitter
campaign, and had 5000 investors and entrepreneurs sign the petition. 356 It included
data about signatories, including home district and campaign contribution history. 357
Ravikant called it “beautiful and visual,” boasting that they “crushed it,” using
technology as a weapon.358 Press accounts credited the success of passage to
Ravikant’s viral push.359

350. Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389,
3436 (2013).
351. Id.
352. Nate Nead, Summary of JOBS Bill and Update, INVESTMENTBANK, http://
investmentbank.com/summary-of-jobs-bill-and-update/ [https://perma.cc/L2U8-ZB4X].
353. Kristen A. Young, Compliance with the Securities Laws in Crowdfunded Securities
Offerings: Startups It’s Your Responsibility!, 34 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 581, 589 (2015).
354. PandoDaily, supra note 271 (timestamp 7:00/8:58).
355. Id. (timestamp 8:15/8:58).
356. Id. (timestamp 7:30/8:58).
357. Id. (timestamp 8:00/8:58).
358. Id. (timestamp 8:30/8:58).
359. See, e.g., Brad Stone, AngelList, the Social Network for Startups, BLOOMBERG (Jan.
17, 2014, 12:36 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-01-16/angellist-the-social
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In terms of lobbying, Ravikant took an equally nontraditional approach: even
though he was told “that’s not the way it’s done,” they paid lobbyists on a contingent
fee-like basis; these lobbyists, in other words, were entitled to full payment only if
the legislation passed.360 Thus Ravikant played a different kind of offense from the
traditional method employed by the other interest groups lobbying for Titles I, V,
and VI.
Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) introduced the initial bill.361 In stark contrast to the
elaborate legislative dictation of Titles I, V, and VI, it tasked the SEC with revising
its rules so that “the prohibition against general solicitation or general advertising . . . shall not apply to offers and sales of securities made pursuant to section
230.506, provided that all purchasers of the securities are accredited investors.” 362
In other words, it delegated the main question to the SEC. The devil of general
solicitation was in the detail of how to allow private firms to offer to the general
public while ensuring that only investors of the requisite high income or net worth to
qualify as accredited investors actually purchased the stock.
Requiring that any purchasers be accredited investors clearly presupposed some
sort of verification process. Representative Maxine Waters (D-CA) was concerned
about sales to unaccredited investors who might be “seduced by public advertising”
and take advantage of the laxity of self-certification procedures to lie about their
assets in order to qualify as accredited investors.363 Thus, she introduced an amendment that would become part of the final bill, tasking the SEC with defining what
constituted “reasonable steps to verify” that purchasers are accredited investors. 364
Representative Waters’s amendment made clear that the SEC had work to do in this
arena, and expressly delegated to the agency the duty of figuring out the best mechanism. And that caused delay. Although the SEC proposed rules on these topics on
August 29, 2012, it was not until it promulgated final rules on July 10, 2013 that the
ban on general solicitation was lifted, effective September 13, 2013.365
Thus, for all Ravikant’s boasting about unconventional lobbying choices, what
Title II’s history shows is that, while success fees may incentivize a lobbyist to get a
bill passed, they might well result in a bill that can pass Congress easily—one that

-network-for-startups#p2 [https://perma.cc/MJT4-9ALB] (discussing Ravikant’s success with
AngelList and noting that AngelList “lobbied the U.S. government to further relax fundraising
restrictions in the JOBS Act”); Ondi Timoner, How Naval Ravikant Risked It All To Pull the
Veil Back on Venture Capital, HUFFINGTON POST BLOG (Oct. 7, 2013, 11:55 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ondi-timoner/how-naval-ravikant-risked_b_4047044.html
[https://perma.cc/R3QY-P9HP].
360. PandoDaily, supra note 271 (timestamp 7:10/8:58).
361. H.R. 2940, 112th Cong. (as introduced in House of Representatives, Sept. 15, 2011).
362. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201, 126 Stat.
306, 313 (2012).
363. Catherine T. Dixon, Title II of the JOBS Act: Are Reports of the Death of General
Solicitation Premature?, INSIGHTS, June 2012, at 2, 5.
364. Id.
365. Samuel Guzik, SEC Issues Final JOBS Act Regulations Allowing Public Solicitation
of Investors in Private Placements Under Rule 506 of Regulation D; New Proposed
Regulations Regulating Rule 506 Private Placements Also Issued for Public Comment on July
10, 2013, CORP. SEC. LAW. BLOG (July 12, 2013), http://corporatesecuritieslawyerblog.com/
?p=172 [https://perma.cc/R8GE-2DPG].
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kicks the hard questions of implementation to the agency, where they can be delayed
and made more complicated. The traditional industry approach to lobbying, on display in Titles I, V, and VI, resulted in the safest, surest, and swiftest deregulatory
result: dictation.
b. Title III: Crowdfunding
Before 2012, the only way the general public—that is, individuals who did not
qualify as accredited investors—could obtain a share of the equity of a corporation
was when it went public. Yet as crowdsourcing—whether by way of donations
(KickStarter, Indiegogo, or Gofundme) or by loans made with interest (Prosper
Marketplace) or interest-free (Kiva)—became more mainstream, it whetted the public’s appetite for the chance to invest their dollars for profit in the equity of private
companies. As Paul Spinrad, an early supporter of federal deregulation to permit
crowdsourcing, put it:
The original federal laws governing the sale of securities were written in
the 1930s, when people had no way to fact-check a smooth telephone
voice and some fancy letterhead mailed with a New York City postmark.
But now, in a world of information ubiquity, these antiquated investor
protections were stifling innovation, economic health, community, and
the pursuit of happiness.366
The history of the legalization of crowdfunding is an irresistibly underdog tale. In
true entrepreneurial fashion, Spinrad, while “[b]rowsing the SEC website,” hit upon
the idea of submitting a public petition for a crowdfunding website. 367 Spinrad partnered with the Sustainable Economies Law Center and on July 1, 2010, filed a “Petition for Rulemaking: Exempt securities offerings up to $100,000 with $100 maximum per investor from registration,” financed (fittingly enough) by the donations of
fifty-two individuals.368 But while Spinrad provided some initial intellectual impetus
for legalizing crowdfunding, he characterized his work to further a crowdfunding
exemption as “a hobby,” explaining, “Between working in perpetual crunch mode at
[his regular job], having two preschool-age kids, and not having a dishwasher, there’s
no way I could do the massive amount of Washington DC face-time that is mandatory
for any federal law change.”369
Enter Sherwood Neiss, Jason Best, and Zak Cassady-Dorion, who created a

366. Paul Spinrad, How Crowdfunding and the JOBS Act Got Started, Told by the Guy
Behind the Big Idea, CROWDSOURCING.ORG (Sept. 19, 2012, 6:21 PM), http://www
.crowdsourcing.org/editorial/how-crowdfunding-and-the-jobs-act-got-started-told-by-the-guy
-behind-the-big-idea/19288 [https://web.archive.org/web/20160414052759/http://www.crowd
sourcing.org/editorial/how-crowdfunding-and-the-jobs-act-got-started-told-by-the-guy-behind
-the-big-idea/19288].
367. Id.
368. Jenny Kassan, Sustainable Economies Law Center, Petition for Rulemaking: Exempt
Securities Offerings up to $100,000 with $100 Maximum per Investor from Registration (July
1, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2010/petn4-605.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SDX-DHRZ].
369. Spinrad, supra note 366.
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regulatory framework they named “Startup Exemption.” 370 As described in their
short video titled “The Story Behind Crowdfund Investing (Or ‘How 3 guys changed
the rules of the game in 460 days’),”371 the exemption they proposed would be limited
to $10,000 per individual investor, with firms able to raise a total of $1 million
through crowdfunding.372 Thanks to “77 year” old regulations, it would take “an Act
of Congress” to change the rules and, as the video puts it, “What can 3 regular guys
get done in Washington?”373
The video goes on to observe that there are three “must-haves” needed to get
anything done in Washington:
1. “[a] large team of D.C. insiders & lobbyists (However Jason, Zak, and Woodie
don’t live in D.C. and don’t have any political experience.)”;374
2. “[a] million-dollar budget” (as opposed to the $54,273 the trio spent on fifteen
trips to DC and the November 2011 rally, including $273 for coffee);375 and
3. “[a]t least 5 years from start to finish” (it took 460 days).376
On September 8, 2011, President Obama endorsed crowdfunding, 377 and on the
same day the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)
signed a report that supported a $1 million crowdfunding exemption. 378 Notably, the
Occupy Wall Street movement began September 17 of the same year. 379 With the

370. About Us, STARTUP EXEMPTION, http://www.startupexemption.com/about-us [https://
perma.cc/A8F2-ST88].
371. How 3 Guys Legalized Crowdfunding in 460 Days, STARTUP EXEMPTION (May 21,
2012), http://www.startupexemption.com/archives/300 [https://perma.cc/Q2NA-PZCQ].
372. Compare the Bills, STARTUP EXEMPTION, http://www.startupexemption.com/compare
-the-bills [https://perma.cc/FS9J-243F]; see also Exemption Framework, STARTUP EXEMPTION
(last updated Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.startupexemption.com/exemption-framework
[https://perma.cc/NF2P-96K9].
373. How 3 Guys Legalized Crowdfunding in 460 Days, supra note 371 (timestamps 0:30,
0:41/2:37).
374. Id. (timestamp 1:11/2:37).
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Fact Sheet: The American Jobs Act, WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 8, 2011),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/08/fact-sheet-american-jobs-act [https://
perma.cc/4ELW-XSFT]; see also David Mashburn, Comment, The Anti-Crowd Pleaser:
Fixing the Crowdfund Act’s Hidden Risks and Inadequate Remedies, 63 EMORY L.J. 127, 144
(2013) (“[I]n September 2011, President Obama endorsed crowdfunding in his proposed
American Jobs Act as a way to stimulate the sluggish economy.”).
378. Aneesh Chopra & Tom Kalil, The President’s American Jobs Act: Fueling Innovation
and Entrepreneurship, WHITE HOUSE: BLOG (Sept. 8, 2011, 11:20 PM), http://www.whitehouse
.gov/blog/2011/09/08/president-s-american-jobs-act-fueling-innovation-and-entrepreneurship
[https://perma.cc/X9ZC-YEGT].
379. Sarah Kunstler, The Right To Occupy—Occupy Wall Street and the First Amendment,
39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 989, 989–90 (2012) (“[The protest was prompted by] a call put out by
Adbusters magazine in July of 2011 featuring the image of a ballerina posing atop the iconic
bronze bull sculpture of Wall Street—while protesters gather in the background amid a cloud
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rise of this populist movement—with its anti-big bank, pro-“99%” message—
crowdfunding’s promise of rejecting traditional funding mechanisms in favor of “the
people” continued to gain traction.
On September 14, Patrick McHenry (R-NC) introduced a three-page bill that
allowed ordinary investors to invest the lesser of $10,000 or 10% of their annual
income or net worth in companies seeking to raise $5 million or less. 380 The initial
bill McHenry introduced did, in fact, dictate. It specified that companies could rely
on investors’ certification of their own income and that any such investors would be
excluded from Section 12(g)’s shareholder of record cap.381 It also included no
delegation of authority to the SEC.
But Title III did not maintain this “short and sweet” character for long. In contrast
to McHenry’s original crowdfunding bill, the final language of Title III delegates
many details to the SEC. Under the second subsection alone, the SEC is called upon
to take the following actions with respect to crowdfunding intermediaries:
1. provide whatever disclosures, “including disclosures related to risks and other
investor education materials, as the Commission shall, by rule, determine
appropriate”;382
2. establish standards for investor-education information;383
3. determine whether it is appropriate for crowdfunding investors to demonstrate
to an intermediary an understanding on any “other matters”;384
4. formulate “measures to reduce the risk of fraud . . . including obtaining a
background and securities enforcement regulatory history check on each officer, director, and person holding more than twenty percent of the outstanding
equity of every issuer whose securities are offered by such person;”385

of tear gas—and the following text: WHAT IS OUR ONE DEMAND?
#OCCUPYWALLSTREET SEPTEMBER 17TH. BRING TENT.”).
380. H.R. 2930, 112th Cong. § 2(a) (as introduced in House of Representatives, Sept. 14, 2011).
381. Id. § 2(b). Interestingly, McHenry later attributed his initiating the bill because of the
plight of a signature American company, Pabst Blue Ribbon beer. Eric Blattberg,
Congressman McHenry Promotes His Crowdfunding Bill, Trashes Competing Senate
Legislation, CROWDSOURCING.ORG (Jan. 24, 2012, 10:25 AM), http://www.crowdsourcing.org
/editorial/congressman-mchenry-promotes-his-crowdfunding-bill-trashes-competing-senate
-legislation/10501 [https://web.archive.org/web/20150326125720/http://www.crowdsourcing.org
/editorial/congressman-mchenry-promotes-his-crowdfunding-bill-trashes-competing-senate
-legislation/10501]. PBR was up for sale, and two advertising executives tried to crowdsource
a bid for the company. The pair obtained over $200 million in pledges from approximately
five million Americans before the SEC called a halt to the campaign. Id.; Danielle Sacks,
Shaking Up Crowdfunding, FAST COMPANY (May 14, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://www
.fastcompany.com/1835677/shaking-crowdfunding [https://perma.cc/2C43-D2AY].
382. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106 § 302(b), 126 Stat.
306, 316 (2012).
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id.

496

I N DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 92:435

5. establish a period before any sale of securities before which information must
be provided to the SEC and potential investors; 386
6. determine when it is appropriate to allow crowdfunding investors to cancel
their commitment;387
7. make efforts the SEC determines appropriate to ensure that no investor in a
twelve-month period has purchased securities that exceed the investment
limits;388
8. determine what steps to protect the privacy of investor information are
appropriate.389
Indeed, Title III contains twenty-three separate provisions whereby Congress
entrusts the SEC with promulgating a rule or articulating a standard in connection
with crowdfunding.390
One explanation for the SEC’s substantial rule-making role in Title III is that the
crowdfunding legislation was the most hotly debated of all the JOBS Act provisions.
Democratic legislators, in particular, were alert to the danger of exposing ordinary
investors to the risks of investing in private companies. 391 Equally noteworthy is that
Title III was not of significant interest to Silicon Valley, the banks, and the stock
exchanges that had lobbied hard for Titles I, V, and VI.392 Indeed, these repeat players
took a negative view of the radical crowdfunding proposal due to fears that it would
lead to the demise of the larger legislative package.
To be sure, even while Title III contains many delegations of rule-making power,
a delegation does not necessarily translate into the grant of actual policy-making
authority. Many scholars, among them Steven Bradford393 and Joan Heminway,394
have argued that Congress placed undue burdens on crowdfunding regulation when
it delegated it to the SEC, by tying the agency’s hands in ways that rendered
crowdfunding unworkable. These criticisms have merit: indeed, in Title III Congress
was quite dictatorial in a manner that hamstrung much of the promise of equity
crowdfunding. But dictatorial and dictating are not the same thing: All I mean to say
when characterizing Title III as an example of extensive delegation is that Congress

386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. §§ 301–05, 126 Stat. 316–23.
391. See Tanya Prive, Why Equity Crowdfunding Could Be Dangerous for Investors and
Entrepreneurs, FORTUNE (May 6, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2016/05/06/equity
-crowdfunding-could-be-dangerous/ [https://perma.cc/BUA6-XVVT].
392. See Michael Kane, Our Reaction to Title III Crowdfunding, HEDGEABLE:
SOPHISTICATED DIGITAL INV. (June 6, 2016), https://www.hedgeable.com/blog/2016/06/our
-reaction-to-title-iii-crowdfunding/ [https://perma.cc/JDX5-KH8N].
393. C. Steven Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption: Promise Unfulfilled,
40 SEC. REG. L.J. 195 (2012).
394. Joan MacLeod Heminway, How Congress Killed Investment Crowdfunding: A Tale
of Political Pressure, Hasty Decisions, and Inexpert Judgments That Begs for a Happy
Ending, 102 KY. L.J. 865, 880–81 (2013–2014).
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did not make it self-executing, and delegated many of the details to the SEC. Backed
by underdogs as Title III was, delegation was probably the best it could get.
c. Title IV
Title IV represents something of a puzzle: it is the odd case where sophisticated
players contented themselves with delegation instead of dictating in the statute itself.
Title IV revitalized Regulation A, a longstanding registration exemption under the
Securities Act of 1933.395 Before the JOBS Act, Regulation A allowed small companies to raise up to five million dollars in capital but required them to file an offering
statement with the SEC and provide an offering circular to potential investors. 396 The
issuing company was also required to adhere to each state’s blue-sky laws.397 These
requirements were less onerous than the costly requirements of full registration under
the Securities Act of 1933, but over time they proved not to be worth the trouble. 398
In 1997, there were fifty-six qualified Regulation A offerings.399 By 2011, there was
only one.400 In the meantime, support grew to revise Regulation A. 401 The result of
this process was Title IV of the JOBS Act. That title increased the amount of capital
private firms can raise Regulation A offerings from $5 million to $50 million.402

395. JD Alois, SEC’s Number #1 Story of 2015: Regulation A+ Rules, CROWDFUND
INSIDER (Jan. 2, 2016, 3:00 PM), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2016/01/79593-secs
-number-1-story-of-2015-regulation-a-rules/ [https://perma.cc/8HQ7-SRTY].
396. Stephen J. Choi, Gatekeepers and the Internet: Rethinking the Regulation of Small
Business Capital Formation, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 27, 32–33 (1998).
397. Alois, supra note 395.
398. On average, companies that go public incur approximately $3.7 million in IPO costs
and cede underwriter fees of five to seven percent. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, CONSIDERING
AN IPO? THE COSTS OF GOING AND BEING PUBLIC MAY SURPRISE YOU 1 (2012),
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/deals/publications/assets/pwc-cost-of-ipo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M5ZV-B7DV]. Additionally, once a company is public, it spends approximately $1.5 million per year as a result of being public. Id.
399. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION: FACTORS
THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS 8 (2012),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592113.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LGY-TA2V].
400. Id. at 9.
401. At the 2009 Annual SEC Government-Business Forum on Small Business Capital
Formation, one out of twenty-six securities regulation recommendations related to Regulation
A, and it simply stated that “[t]he Regulation A $5 million ceiling should be increased.” SEC.
& EXCH. COMM’N, 2009 ANNUAL SEC GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS FORUM ON SMALL BUSINESS
CAPITAL FORMATION: FINAL REPORT 14–18, 17 (2010), http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus
/gbfor28.pdf [https://perma.cc/LP6Z-3NHV]. At the 2010 meeting, three out of thirty-six
recommendations advocated for distinct changes to Regulation A. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
2010 ANNUAL SEC GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS FORUM ON SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL
FORMATION: FINAL REPORT 17–22 (2011), https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/gbfor29.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZEM2-9LSQ] (recommending some type of change to Regulation A in
recommendations 4A, 5, 7B, and 16).
402. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rules To Facilitate Smaller
Companies’ Access to Capital (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015
-49.html [https://perma.cc/8NF5-HC85].
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Title IV has an out-of-step quality because it contains several instances of
delegation to the SEC, despite its support from sophisticated players. The surface
explanation is that sophisticated players themselves asked for these delegations, but
the more complex explanation relates to resistance that interest groups, such as the
NASAA, expressed to the idea of broad federal preemption.
With regard to the surface explanation, the following chronology is telling. In
December 2010, the House Financial Services Committee conducted a hearing
unambiguously titled A Proposal To Increase the Offering Limit Under SEC
Regulation A.403 William Hambrecht, founder, Chairman, and CEO of WR
Hambrecht and Company testified, 404 as did Michael Lempres, of SVB (Silicon
Valley Bank) Financial Group, and Congresswoman Anna Eshoo, whose district encompassed Silicon Valley.405 Surprisingly, both Hambrecht and Lempres urged
Congress to explicitly increase the Regulation A ceiling while allowing the SEC to
promulgate detailed rules.406 Lempres stated: “[T]he ideal solution would be a
mandate from Congress to raise the offering limit for Regulation A and to set a minimum ceiling figure. I do like the idea of revisiting it periodically and deferring to
SEC the terms and conditions.”407 Hambrecht agreed:
I do think, though, that there are some time pressures here, and that
everybody would like to see this get going quickly.
I think if the SEC has a rule change, they have to go through a process
that could take some time, and I would think a congressional mandate
would move it quickly, and then definitely leave the SEC to implement
it and to change whatever they see fit to change . . . .408
Hambrecht is a sophisticated Silicon Valley presence; he founded what became
Hambrecht & Quist, the firm that took Apple and Adobe Systems public and
pioneered the auction IPO.409 It is unclear why he would assert that a congressional
mandate that would raise the limit to $50 million, coupled with SEC rule making,
would ultimately result in a “quick” change in the law. Lempres, a Silicon Valley
Bank representative, was presumably also aware of the issue. Yet in the 2010

403. A Proposal To Increase the Offering Limit Under SEC Regulation A: Hearing Before
the H. Fin. Servs. Comm., 111th Cong. (2010).
404. Id. at 8 (statement of William R. Hambrecht, Founder, Chairman & CEO, WR
Hambrecht & Co.).
405. Id. at 3, 10. Hambrecht later stated to a reporter that Eshoo was the “real prime mover”
in assembling the hearing. Timothy P. Carney, Want a Voice in Washington? Invest in a
Politician, WASH. EXAMINER (Dec. 12, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com
/want-a-voice-in-washington-invest-in-a-politician/article/108230 [https://perma.cc/22GY-3EZ9].
406. A Proposal To Increase the Offering Limit Under SEC Regulation A, supra note 403,
at 22.
407. Id.
408. Id. (emphasis added).
409. Matthew J. Belvedere, Google Made More IPO Money My Way: Bill Hambrecht,
CNBC (Aug. 19, 2014, 10:58 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/08/19/google-made-more
-ipo-money-my-way-bill-hambrecht.html [https://perma.cc/T2YM-TJBB]; see also About
WR Hambrecht + Co., WR HAMBRECHT + CO., https://wrhambrecht.com/about/ [https://
perma.cc/2Q43-F3NM].
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hearing, they asked only for Congress to raise the overall threshold; the details they
were content to leave with the SEC.
Perhaps Hambrecht knew that House Democrats would not have supported a bill
that dictated blue-sky-law preemption at the congressional level as opposed to by
way of SEC action. Indeed, there are several indications that Title IV would not have
garnered the bipartisan support it needed to pass in both chambers of Congress had
it explicitly dictated blue-sky law preemption. At a subcommittee hearing in 2011,
AFL-CIO spokesman Damon Silvers was openly hostile toward the bill and the prospect of less consumer protection.410 Congressmen Lynch (D-MA) expressly endorsed Mr. Silvers’s views.411 Additionally, when the bill moved from the committee
to the House floor in early 2011, the Democrats signaled that they would fight federal
preemption, reasoning that state blue-sky laws protected investors.412 In May of
2014, Representative McHenry (R-NC) introduced a bill to dictate blue-sky preemption, but the bill ultimately languished in the Democrat-controlled Senate.413 Finally,
while it did not make much of an appearance in the legislative debate, the NASAA
lobbied aggressively against blue-sky law preemption throughout the SEC’s ensuing
rule-making process.414
Whether because of political resistance, or because its backers did not ask for
dictation, in Title IV Congress delegated the question of federal preemption to the
SEC. It was not until December of 2013 that the SEC proposed rules—rules that,
notably, provided for exemption from the operation of all state blue-sky laws.415

410. Legislative Proposals To Promote Job Creation, Capital Formation and Market
Certainty: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Entities of
the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. at 16 (2011) (statement of Damon A. Silvers, Policy
Director and Special Counsel, ALF-CIO stating that Title IV “should be called the ‘Promote
Penny Stock Fraud Act.’”); id. at 17 (framing the committee’s proposed bill as a “systematic
effort to strip the SEC of the resources necessary to protect American investors”).
411. Id. at 17 (“I want to associate myself—and I do this rarely—but I want to associate
myself with the remarks of Mr. Silvers.”). This is not altogether surprising because Massachusetts used merit review to bar its residents from buying Apple stock in the 1980s because it
was deemed to be too risky. Samuel Guzik, The State of Massachusetts vs. Regulation A+:
State Regulators Take the SEC to Court, CROWDFUND INSIDER (May 26, 2015, 8:15 AM),
http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2015/05/68299-the-state-of-massachusetts-vs-regulationa-state-regulators-take-the-sec-to-court/ [https://perma.cc/766K-A2GY].
412. H.R. REP. NO. 112-206, at 13 (2011), http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles
/hr1070hreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/XC97-DCAC] (“Regulation A securities are sometimes
high-risk offerings that may be susceptible to fraud, making the protections provided by state
review essential. To address these concerns, the Democrats offered an amendment to clarify
that state securities would only be preempted if the Regulation A security is sold on an
exchange or sold only to a qualified purchaser. While that amendment was defeated, we will
continue to work to ensure that the final bill provides adequate oversight.”).
413. Guzik, supra note 411.
414. JD Alois, NASAA Continues To Lobby SEC on Blue Sky Review & Title IV of the
JOBS Act, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Feb. 28, 2015, 11:19 AM), http://www.crowdfundinsider
.com/2015/02/63544-nasaa-continues-to-lobby-sec-on-blue-sky-review-title-iv-of-the-jobs-act/
[https://perma.cc/H54G-NG6L].
415. Kiran Lingam, The Reg A+ Bombshell: $50M Unaccredited Equity Crowdfunding
Title IV Takes Center Stage, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Mar. 25, 2015, 1:20 PM), http://www
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Thus, as with general solicitation and crowdfunding, delegation meant delay. However, in this case, the bill’s backers ultimately achieved at the agency level the federal
preemption that it would have been difficult to attain in Congress. Perhaps in this
case Hambrecht and his Silicon Valley allies made the shrewd choice that delegation
was the better part of valor.
3. Data
The data in Figures 5 and 6, which split the JOBS Act into Titles I, V, and VI, on
the one hand, and II, III, and IV, on the other, confirm that indeed, the JOBS Act is,
in delegation terms, really two acts. Almost all of the delegations brought about by
the Act occur in Titles II, III, and IV. Kate Mitchell’s IPO Task Force backed Title
I, and that title contained the sole permissive delegation in Titles I, V, or VI. Title V,
backed by SecondMarket and Wawa, contained no delegations or agency discretion
of any kind. And neither did Title VI, which loosened section 12(g) requirements for
financial institutions.
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Figure 5. Mandatory and Permissive
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CONCLUSION
The dictation/delegation thesis posits that the political economy of securities
regulation is more complicated than prior scholarship suggests. Professors Romano,
Ribstein, and Bainbridge may be correct that “bubble laws” follow financial crises,
but these bubble laws often delegate much of the real implementation work to
administrative agencies. At the agency level, regulation is necessarily delayed, and
may be diluted and disputed as well. On the flipside, in noncrisis times, it may well
be possible for industry members to secure deregulation at the congressional level
—and, in these instances, the resulting legislation will tend to dictate. Even
controlling for divisions between Congress and the executive, and within the legislative branch, whether a crisis gives rise to legislation is a statistically significant
predictor of legislative delegation.
To be sure, the data show that the dictation/delegation thesis does not play out in
a lockstep fashion. If the genesis for a bill comes from an administrative agency and
delegation is a lesser evil than the status quo of state regulation—as was the case
with NSMIA—resulting legislation can contain significant delegation. 416 Likewise,
even in the midst of a genuine crisis, Congress will sometimes eschew delegation in
an effort to move swiftly and directly, with a focused goal in mind, as it did with
SIPA.417 Finally, even acts like the JOBS Act—adopted in a noncrisis setting—may

416. See supra notes 218–20 and accompanying text.
417. See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text.
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reflect a mix of dictation and delegation strategies. 418 Here, dictation-oriented
sophisticated players backed the core of the Act, but supplementary provisions were
added to it by less experienced political actors more willing to countenance agency
oversight. And, in the case of Title IV, delegation may have been proved the best
offense after all, since it ultimately secured federal preemption at the agency level
that would have been risky to attempt in Congress. 419 Parsing the amount of
delegation ultimately may offer clues as to the differing power of the various interest
groups that join together to support a single legislative package.
The dictation/delegation thesis continues to matter in securities law. Notably, the
FAST Act, signed by President Obama on December 4, 2015, was an omnibus bill
that encompassed provisions from what had been colloquially known as “JOBS Act
2.0.”420 These titles do not form part of this Article’s data sample because, unlike the
other enactments, they are not separate, free-standing securities-focused laws, but
rather a part of an enormous multisubject enactment. The political economy that gave
rise to the securities provisions of this legislation would be too hard to disentangle
from the larger whole (and in any event the comparison would not be fair). Yet it is
worth noting that these provisions are generally dictatorial. For example, Title LXXI
(its title number showcases the breadth of the legislation into which it was inserted),
Improving Access to Capital for Emerging Growth Companies, makes technical
changes: it shortens the time from twenty-one to fifteen days before a road show that
an EGC needs to publicly disclose its confidential filing, permits smaller reporting
companies to use forward incorporation by reference to update information (thereby
relieving them from having to disclose historical financial statements that will not be
part of the final registration statement), and provides a one-year grace period if an
issuer is an ECG when it publicly files for its IPO but loses its EGC status during the
course of SEC review.421 The only delegations to the SEC are ministerial ones.422
Similarly most of the other FAST Act securities provisions dictate policy rather than
delegating it.423

418. See supra Part V.B.
419. See supra notes 376–80 and accompanying text.
420. See, e.g., Garrett A. DeVries, Rosa A. Testani, Susan H. Lent & Ryan Thompson,
Jobs Act 2.0—New FAST Act Legislation Signed into Law To Facilitate Capital Formation,
AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUEUR & FELD LLP: AG DEAL DIARY (Dec. 9, 2015), https://
www.akingump.com/en/experience/practices/corporate/ag-deal-diary/jobs-act-2-0-new-fast-act
-legislation-signed-into-law-to-1.html [https://perma.cc/7XDB-GXEJ].
421. Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, §§ 71001–03,
129 Stat. 1312, 1783–84 (2015).
422. Note, while the SEC must revise its general instructions for Forms S-1 and F-1, I
classify these as ministerial changes where the SEC has no discretion to exercise.
423. Title LXXVI, Reforming Access for Investments in Startup Enterprises, provides a
new resale exception for issuers. § 76001, 129 Stat. at 1787–90. It dictates a host of
requirements, as long as each purchaser is an accredited investor, there is no general solicitation, and the issuer provides “reasonably current” information, including among other details,
financial statements from the past two years, including a balance sheet and income statement,
the issuer’s name, address, nature of business, officers and directors, transfer agent, the exact
title, class, and par value of the security, the number of shares. It further specifies that such
statements be prepared according to GAAP and that they are presumed current if the balance
sheet is within sixteen months of the transaction and the income statement is within twelve
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This Article poses a challenge for public choice and administrative law scholars.
How often does the pattern of delegation versus dictation repeat itself in other subject
areas? It may be that the securities field is sui generis; that perhaps this pattern of
postcrisis delegation and noncrisis dictation cannot be generalized beyond its narrow
confines. Securities regulation offers a distinctively attractive place from which to
launch the delegation/dictation thesis, whatever its reach may ultimately prove to be,
because securities law is relatively noncontroversial in the public mind. Testing the
validity of the dictation/delegation thesis in more politically charged fields such as
banking regulation and tax may reveal different strategies employed by industries
looking to implement their policy preferences into law and regulation. The
dictation/delegation thesis offered and tested here is thus an important step—but only
a first step—in further exploring its importance to the field of delegation.

months of the transaction. If the balance sheet is from more than six months prior to the
transaction date, it must be accompanied by additional income statements from the time of the
balance sheet up until six months prior to the transaction date. The title goes on to dictate still
more requirements, and contains not a single delegation. Title LXXXIV, Small Company
Simple Registration, directs the SEC to revise Form S-1 to allow smaller reporting companies
to automatically update information in an S-1 registration statement after by incorporating
reports filed with the SEC after the registration statement is deemed effective. This ability to
“forward-incorporate” avoids the cost and complication of smaller companies having to update
the statement with supplements or post-effective amendments. This is a ministerial delegation,
since all the SEC must do is implement Congress’ directive. However, the dictation/delegation
pattern is no binary. Title LXXII, Disclosure Modernization and Simplification does contain
two substantial delegations.

